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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fifty years since Edwin Sutherland coined the term "white
collar crime" there has been periodic interest in the subject of corpo-
rate criminality.1 The most recent period of interest emerged in 1980
* Assistant Professor, Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Penn-
sylvania; B.A., Johns Hopkins University; J.D., Northeastern University; Ph.D.,
Rutgers University.
My appreciation to Kip Schlegel for his important contribution to sections IV and
V of this manuscript. Thomas W. Dunfee, Andrew von Hirsch, and D. Bruce
Johnsen made helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRME (1980); MAR-
sHALL B. CuNARD ET Al., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979); DONALD R.
CRESSEY, CRmuNAL ORGANIZATION: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1972); M. DAVID
ERmLANN & RiCHARD L. LuNDmAN, CORPORATE AND GOvERNmENTAL DEVIANCE:
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SocIETY (1982);
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with ground-breaking scholarship examining the law violations of the
largest corporations in the United States.2 Within the last five years,
research has focused on sentencing. Even though there have been rel-
atively few empirical studies of the sentencing of corporations, as com-
pared with the sentencing of individuals, there is no shortage of
serious discussion regarding corporate sanctions.3 Legal scholars,
economists, and sociologists have engaged in a lengthy debate over
proposals for organizational sanctions issued by the United States Sen-
tencing Commission ("Sentencing Commission").4
Gilbert Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases of 1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYsTEMs, A TYPOLOGY 139 (Marshall B.
Clinard & Richard Quirmey eds., 1967); SusAN P. SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITAL-
ISTS: TARGET OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1984); Edwin H.
Sutherland, Crime of Corporations, in THE SUTHERLAND PAPERS 78 (Albert K.
Cohen et al. eds., 1956); EDWIN H. SuTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949);
Marshall B. Clinard, Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regula-
tions, 11 AM. Soc. REV. 258 (1946); Robert E. Lane, Why Businessmen Violate the
Law, 44 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sci. 151 (1953); Edwin H. Suther-
land, Is 'White Collar Crime' Crime? 10 AM. Soc. REV. 132 (1945); Edwin H. Suth-
erland, White Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1940).
2. See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 1; see also MARSHALL B. CuLNARD Er Ai.,
supra note 1. For a general discussion of the nature corporate crime research, see
Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research, in 1 AD-
VANCES IN CRrMINOLOGICAL THEORY 31 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds.,
1988); and John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, The Plausibility of Corporate Crime
Research, in 2 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 21 (William S. Laufer &
Freda Adler eds., 1990).
3. Three reasons may be offered for the dearth of empirical work: (1) there is a
conspicuous absence of theories of corporate crime causation-theories that
might promote both a qualitative and quantitative body of literature, (2) until the
United States Sentencing Commission initiated its surveys on organizational
sanctions, data on corporate prosecutions and convictions were difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain, and (3) convictions of corporations under state or federal
law are infrequent events, as compared with convictions of individuals. Clinard
and Yeager comment on the lack of scholarship in writing: "Only recently has
corporate crime begun seriously to concern the public, government agencies, and
scholars.... Public concern of course influences both legislatures and law en-
forcement agencies and affects research trends in law, sociology, and particularly,
criminology. Accordingly, textbooks purporting to analyze social problems have,
with few exceptions, focused on more conventional crimes." CLINARD & YEAGER,
supra note 1, at 12-13 (citation omitted); cf. Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and
Punishment. A Study of Social Harm and Sentencing Practice in the Federal
Courts 1984-1987, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605 (1989); Mark A. Cohen et al., Organi-
zations as Defendants in Federal Court- A Preliminary Analysis of Prosecutions,
Convictions, and Sanctions, 1984-1987, 10 WHrTIER L. REv. 103 (1988).
4. An extensive literature has developed tracking the progress of the United States
Sentencing Commission and its draft proposals. The most recent collection of
articles appeared in a symposium issue of the Boston University Law Review en-
titled Sentencing the Corporation. See, e.g., Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties,
Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REv. 395 (1991);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Dis-
appearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991);
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The early Sentencing Commission proposals rested on a weak
foundation, it is argued, because they treated sentencing as a single,
largely isolated phenomenon independent of the basic premises of the
substantive criminal law.5 Such treatment neglected the existence of
a direct relation between the assessment of culpability and the deserv-
edness of punishment.6 This neglect may be attributed in part to the
confusion and controversy that surrounds criminal liability of corpo-
rate offenders appearing in the form of "non-human" persons.7 More
likely, it resulted from a steadfast commitment to an intellectual para-
Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment- An Update on Sentencing
Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247 (1991); Jonathan R.
Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 315 (1991); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Orga-
nizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 421 (1991). For references to earlier work, see KIP
SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990).
5. See infra notes 54-102 and accompanying text.
6. Throughout this paper I will use the term culpability to reflect the notion of
blameworthiness. As discussed in Parts I to III, culpability or blameworthiness is
raised as an issue both prior to and after conviction. Prior to conviction, culpabil-
ity is raised in relation to liability. After conviction, culpability is raised in rela-
tion to severity of sentence. See, eg., HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
JUsTICE 76,436-38 (1979)('"The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of
criminal conduct.... Punishment that fits the crime is punishment in proportion
to the culpability of the criminal conduct and it is what the perpetrator deserves
for his crime."); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 317
(1960)("[P]unishment implies the criminal's moral culpability and is apt (fitting,
correct) in light of that."); ANDREW VON HISCH, DOING JuSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISIIENTS 80 (1976)("Here there is one well-established principle: that pro-
hibited behavior causing (or risking) the same harm varies in seriousness depend-
ing on whether it is intentional, reckless, negligent, or punishable regardless of
the actor's intent .. ").
7. Following New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909), there has been considerable debate over the logic and wisdom of
imputing mens rea to corporate entities. See R.A. DuFF, INTENTION, AGENCY &
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1990); PE-
TER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Virginia
Held, Corporations, Persons and Responsibility, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE CORPORATION 159 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986); Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate
Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827 (1927); James R. Elkins, Corporations
and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Peter A.
French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979); Michael
Keeley, Organizations as Non-persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1981); Frederic
P. Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1928); Larry May,
Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69 (1983);
Michael McDonald, The PersonZess Paradigm, 37 U. TORONTO L.J. 212 (1987);
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation-A Study of the Model
Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 21
(1957); Comment, Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime: Regulating Cor-
porate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979);
Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 870 (1973); Note, Criminal
Liability of Corporations, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 241 (1914).
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digm that does not require an assessment of culpability in relation to
harm at the time of sentencing. Notably, the debate that accompanied
the deliberations of the Sentencing Commission over organizational
sanctions was grounded in differences over ideology. Economists, who
proposed economic models derived from theories of deterrence,
searched for efficiency in optimal penalties. Others, including interest
groups in the business community, fought hard for a more eclectic
consideration of harm, culpability, and mitigation in fashioning orga-
nizational sanctions.8
The last effort by the Sentencing Commission, codified in law on
November 1, 1991,9 did a masterful job in addressing culpability in re-
lation to corporate sanctions.'0 What is left, however, is a less than
adequate corporate criminal law. The assessment of culpability in re-
lation to liability remains couched in a poorly drafted and presented
federal criminal law. The federal criminal law relies upon obscure
and antiquated culpability provisions. Differing interpretations of cul-
pability provisions in both individual and corporate prosecutions are
nearly impossible to reconcile. These problems, as well as others, con-
tribute to the commonly-held view that the federal criminal law is no
more than a "hodgepodge of conflicting, contradictory, and imprecise
laws with little relevance to each other or to the state of the criminal
law as a whole."11
8. This debate resulted in three draft proposals from the Sentencing Commission,
and numerous conferences and public forums. For a detailed description of the
Sentencing Commission's work, see UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
(1991). For additional commentary, see Block, supra note 4; Macey, supra note 4,
at 316-17 ("Notably, the Sentencing Commission's proposal for organizational
sanctions was wholly devoid of empirical or theoretical foundation. Its proposals
were politically oriented, rather than policy oriented. Indeed, if nothing else, the
process of establishing sentencing guidelines has made it clear that the work of
the Sentencing Commission has entered the realm of special-interest politics.");
Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying
Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 513 (1989); Jeffrey S.
Parker, The Current Corporate Sentencing Pposals: History and Critque, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 133 (1990); and Cohen, The New Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines: The Beginning or the End of the Controversy? 1 (1991)(unpublished
manuscript, on file with the NEBRASKA LAw REvIEw)("A large part of the disa-
greement over corporate sentencing appears to be grounded in ideological
differences").
9. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 8A1.1-8E1.3 (1992).
10. See infr notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
11. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977)(Senate Report for S. 1437, the Crim-
inal Justice Code Reform Act of 1977). If this assessment appears overly critical,
consider the remarks of former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh who only
recently called for a recodification of the federal criminal code:
Our federal criminal laws are presently scattered among 50 titles of the
United States Code, containing over 23,000 pages of text. They cannot be
understood without review of case decisions encompassed in 2300
1052 [Vol. 71:1049
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It would be unfair to place the burden of federal criminal law re-
form upon the Sentencing Commission. But it is equally true that any
genuine effort to consider culpability in relation to sentence severity,
no matter how successful, would be frustrated by the obfuscation of
existing federal statutory law.12 The current fascination with organi-
zational sentencing has completely overlooked the fact that the sub-
stantive law upon which the new sentencing guidelines are based is
wholly inadequate. This article argues that Congress' failure to make
meaningful statutory reforms to the United States Code over the last
twenty years has compromised the value of the recently enacted sen-
tencing guidelines for organizations. In passing the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 ("SRA"), which gave rise to these new guidelines,
Congress proceeded as if there were no logical connection between the
substantive law and the law of sentencing.13 So the question remains:
If the SRA was enacted in order to achieve honesty, uniformity, and
proportionality in sentencing, can this be achieved given the current
state of federal law?
Part I of this Article reviews general principles of corporate liabil-
ity. Part H examines pre-conviction assessment of culpability. Part III
considers post-conviction assessment of culpability. Part IV discusses
sentencing in relation to culpability. Part V briefly contrasts propos-
als for determining genuine corporate intent with culpability provi-
sions found in extant law.
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Corporate criminal law requires both a basis of liability and an at-
volumes, containing over 3,000,000 pages. They are contaminated, if you
will, by the inclusion of over 1700 essentially regulatory violations ....
The traditionally recognized forms of wrongdoing are lost among multi-
ple and confused citations.
Richard Thornburgh, Address to the Conference of the Society for the Reform of
the Criminal Law, in FED. NEWS SERviCE, January 22, 1990.
12. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
13. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) found in Title H of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3553, was passed by Congress to struc-
ture the discretion of federal judges and, thus, diminish unwarranted sentencing
disparity. The SRA led to: (1) the dismantling of the United States Parole Com-
mission, (2) the development of determinate rather than indeterminate sentenc-
ing in federal courts, (3) sentence review by U.S. Courts of Appeal, and (4) the
establishment of the United States Sentencing Commission. For a recent criti-
cism of the effects of the SRA, see Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the
Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
The SRA was designed by Congress to promote fairness in sentencing. Fair-
ness was to be achieved by moving toward some very admirable goals: (1) honesty
in sentencing, (2) uniformity in sentencing, and (3) proportionality in sentencing.
UNrrED STATES SENTENciNG Co MSssioN, GuIDmuNF-s MANuAL 2-4 (1990).
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tribution of culpability. Liability becomes a threshold issue-"should
the act in question be subjected to criminal punishment?" 14 In federal
courts, liability rules for corporations are derived from agency princi-
ples, and have evolved in case law.15 This may be contrasted with lia-
bility rules for state law violations which generally follow the
provisions in the Model Penal Code ("MPC").16 Of course, both state
14. VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 80 ("Culpability, it should be noted, affects both
questions of liability ('Should the person be punished at all?') and questions of
allocation ('How severely should he be punished?'). Liability is a threshold ques-
tion: Whether the behavior involved sufficient culpability to be punishable at
all."); see also Stanislaw Frankowski, Mens Rea and Punishment in England: In
Search of Interdependence of the Two Basic Components of Criminal Liability (A
Historical Perspective), 63 U. DET. L. REV. 393 (1986).
15. See, e.g., New York Cent. and Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); United States v.
Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984)(upholding corporation's conviction for em-
ployee's filing of false Medicare claims); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d
1291 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976)(knowledge of supervisory
employee is knowledge of the corporation); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963)(conviction of corporate motor carrier upheld
for employee's falsification of logs); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d
120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962)("The corporations can be found guilty, therefore, only if
the evidence shows that each, acting through its human agents, deliberately did
these acts, that is, with the corporation "knowing" that they were being done.");
Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1959)(con-
viction of corporation for employees' conversion and stealing of property); Riss &
Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958) (corporations can be found guilty
for "knowing and willful" violations of federal statutes through the doctrine of
respondeat superior); cf. United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1368 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)("Individuals or corporations used without their knowledge or consent
by others in the commission of offenses may not possess the requisite criminal
intent to be guilty of an offense." (citation omitted)); United States v. Gibson
Products Co., 426 F. Supp 768 (S.D. Texas 1976)(corporation's conviction for em-
ployee's false entries upheld under theory of respondeat superior); United States
v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Vir. 1974)("A corporation can
only act through its employees and, consequently, the acts of its employees,
within the scope of their employment, constitute the acts of the corporation.");
United States v. Griffin, 401 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975)(conviction of corpora-
tion for acts of bribery by its president); United States v. Thompson-Powell Drill-
ing Co., 196 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Texas 1961)(corporation found liable for
employees' violation of the Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962) sets forth the liabil-
ity rules:
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other
than the Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corpo-
rations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the
corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense
designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable
or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall
apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of af-
1054
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and federal law provide for the imputation or attribution of liability of
agents and employees to corporate entities.17
A. Federal Corporate Criminal Liability
Courts interpreting federal statutory law find corporations crimi-
nally liable for the conduct of employees acting within the scope of
employment or with apparent authority, and with an intent to benefit
the corporation.S Under the doctrine of respondeat superior corpora-
tions are viewed as principals. Officers, directors, and all employees-
whether managers or subordinates-are considered agents of the cor-
poration.1 9 Thus, criminal liability extends to the corporation for
criminal acts committed by: (1) officers and directors,2 0 (2) managers
and supervisors,2 ' (3) subordinate employees,2 2 and (4) independent
firmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or (c) the com-
mission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded,
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of
his office or employment.
Id-
For an interpretation of these rules, see Mueller, supra note 7; and Herbert L.
Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 CoLmn. L. REv. 594 (1963), and see
also Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal
Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 593 (1988), in a special issue of the Rutgers Law Journal
devoted to the 25th Anniversary of the Model Penal Code.
17. For a thorough review of both state and federal imputation cases, see KATHLEEN
F. BRicKEY, CoRPoRATE CRInmAL LABn=Y (1984).
18. The term "scope of employment" includes "acts on the corporation's behalf in
performance of the agent's general line of work." United States v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985); cf. United States v.
Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 823 (upholding the following jury instruction: "Whether the
agents' acts or omissions were committed within the scope of their employment is
a question of fact. To be acting within his employment, the agent first must have
intended that his act would have produced some benefit to the corporation or
some benefit to himself and the corporation second."). The requirement of "in-
tent to benefit the corporation" has been considered a critical factor in "equating
the agent's action with that of the corporation." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 307 F.2d 120,128 (5th Cir. 1962); see also BRICKEY, supra note 16, at §§ 3:01-
3:08.
19. The unqualified application of the doctrine of respondeat superior ("let the
master answer") to corporations has spurred some debate. Critics argue that it is
unfair to hold officers, directors, and high managerial agents liable for the acts of
low level employees. See, eg., Mueller, supra note 7; Comment, supra note 7.
20. Se4 e.g., United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir. 1949), cert
denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963).
For a discussion of the these different levels of liability, see Elkins, supra note 7.
21. See C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945); United States v.
American Radiation & Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
22. See United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The rationale
for holding subordinates liable as stated in United States v. E. Brooke Matlack,
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957) is that:
While the primary responsibility for conducting the operations of the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1049
contractors.23
A recent statement of the general rule of corporate criminal liabil-
ity under federal law is found in United States v. Basic Construction
Co.,24 in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a convic-
tion under section 1 of the Sherman Act25 for bid rigging in state road-
paving contracts. At trial, Basic Construction Company argued that
the bid rigging activities were performed by low-level employees with-
out the knowledge of high-level officials, and that the Company had a
strict policy against such practices. In a per curiam opinion, the Court
ruled that "a corporation may be held criminally responsible for anti-
trust violations committed by its employees if they were acting within
the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit
of the corporation even if... such acts were against corporate policy or
express instructions."26
More elaborate rules for the federal courts, however, have been
proposed. Liability rules were first discussed at length by the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws ("Brown
Commission") over twenty years ago.27 The Brown Commission re-
corporation lay with its principal officers, it was their duty in delegating
authority to lesser agents to take effective measures to supervise and
assure performance of the affirmative duty imposed upon the corpora-
tion. Thus the corporation cannot avoid responsibility by merely saying
that a subordinate agent neglected his duty.
Id. at 820.
23. See United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947).
24. United States v. Basic Const. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464
U.S. 956 (1983); see also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Continental Baking Co. v. United
States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960). In Continental Baking, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that:
There is an officer or agent of a corporation with broad express author-
ity, generally holding a position of some responsibility, who performs a
criminal act related to the corporate principal's business. Under such
circumstances, the courts have held that so long as the criminal act is
directly related to the performance of the duties which the officer or
agent has the broad authority to perform, the corporate principal is lia-
ble for the criminal act also, and must be deemed to have "authorized"
the criminal act.
Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1992).
26. United States v. Basic Const. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983). This statement
of law has been interpreted broadly to include all federal criminal law violations.
For example, in United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d
399 (4th Cir. 1985), the Court held: "We believe that Basic Construction states a
generally applicable rule on corporate criminal liability despite the fact that it
addresses violations of the antitrust laws." 1d. at 407, n.5. See also Old Monastery
Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
27. The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Chairman of the National Commission on Re-
1056
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commended corporate liability for any offense committed by an agent
who was authorized, commanded, or requested to act by: (1) the board
of directors, (2) an executive officer, (3) a person who-controls the or-
ganization or is responsible for policy formation, or (4) a person other-
wise considered responsible under a statute.28 According to the
Brown Commission, a successful effort to codify liability rules would
have the effect of addressing two critical problems: (1) the existing
uncertainty regarding the extent of liability for acts committed by
agents of the corporation, and (2) the "inappropriateness" of extant
rules of accountability.29
A number of versions of these liability rules appeared in draft pro-
posals for the revision of the Federal Criminal Code during the late
1970s and early 1980s. In the last proposal, found in the Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1981, organizations would be liable for the acts of any
agent that: (a) occur in the performance of their duties, (b) are in-
tended to benefit the organization, and (c) are ratified or adopted by
the organization. Alternatively, liability may be found where there is
a failure on the part of the organization to discharge a specific duty
imposed by law.3 0
B. State Corporate Criminal Liability
It is worthwhile, for purposes of comparison, to examine analogous
state liability rules. The codification of the MPC by the American
Law Institute in 1962 ushered in a new era in uniform liability for
state corporate criminal law violations.3 1 The MPC identifies three
form of Federal Criminal Laws, submitted a final report to the President and
Congress on January 7,1971. In this report, the Brown Commission described the
many features of the proposed criminal code, including the fact that:
Unlike existing Title 18, the [proposed] Code is comprehensive. It brings
together all federal felonies, many of which are presently found outside
Title 18; it codifies common defenses, which presently are left to conflict-
ing common law decisions by the courts; it establishes standard princi-
ples of criminal liability and standard meanings for terms employed in
the definitions of offenses and defenses.
NATIONAL COMMSSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CR4IMNAL LAWS, at xii (Final
Report 1971).
28. NATIONAL CODMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 1 WORKING
PAPERS 214 (1970).
29. Id. at 163.
30. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1982). This section superseded the liability
rules found in S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Congress never passed S. 1722
due, in part, to insufficient time. Subsequently, according to Norman Abrams,
'Te steam went out of the effort to adopt a comprehensive criminal code revi-
sion and Congress began again to consider crime bills that treat substantive crimi-
nal law issues piecemeal." NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRMNAL LAw AND ITS
ENFoRCEm=nT 67 (1986).
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a discussion
of the efforts to change state penal codes, see Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Penal
1992] 1057
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distinct forms of liability, i.e., regulatory offenses, failures to discharge
duties imposed by law, and penal law violations. First, corporations
are liable for minor, regulatory offenses where a clear legislative pur-
pose to impose liability is present, and the agent's actions were on be-
half of the corporation and within the scope of his authority.32 The
basis of liability here is vicarious, found in the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Notably, the use of a due diligence defense limits the reach
of this liability rule by allowing a corporation to escape conviction if it
can establish that a responsible supervisory officer used due diligence
to prevent the offense. Second, a corporation is liable where the of-
fense is based on a failure to discharge a specific duty of performance
imposed by law.33 Finally, corporations are liable for all penal law
violations, with few exceptions, where the "offense was authorized,
requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the
board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment".3 4 This fi-
nal category, which has been the subject of much deliberation and de-
bate, does not adopt the broad respondeat superior approach of section
207(1)(a) and confines liability to a narrow class of criminal acts-
those concerning high managerial agents whose acts reflect the policy
of the corporate body.35 Some states' legislatures have found section
207(1)(c) too restrictive and, thus, have proceeded cautiously in adopt-
ing this section. Most states, however, have used section 207(1) (c) as a
rough guide for drafting less restrictive provisions.36
Code: The Culpable Mental States and Related Matters, 61 KY. L.J. 657 (1973);
Note, The Mens Rea Provisions of the Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-The Con-
tinuing Uncertainty, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 354 (1972); Note, The Proposed Tennessee
Criminal Code-General Interpretive Provisions and Culpability, 41 TENN. L.
REV. 131 (1973).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207(1)(b)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
35. This is in sharp contrast to federal liability rules. Cf. United States v. Basic Con-
str. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983); Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158
F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946).
36. For example, according to Brickey,
[To the extent that section 2.07 has served as a model rule of corporate
liability for crime, its role has been closer to that of rough theoretical
model than that of model law. In its first twenty-five years, section 2.07
has succeeded in providing an organizing principle around which many
state laws have been modeled, but is has yet to achieve the goal of bring-
ing order and rationality to this unruly branch of the law.
Brickey, supra note 16, at 632. A host of state cases discuss corporate liability
issues. Consider, for example, Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494
A.2d 1139 (Pa. Super. 1985)(involuntary manslaughter); State v. Christy Pontiac-
GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1984)(theft and forgery); State v. Chapman
Dodge Center, Inc., 428 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983)(theft); Granite Constr. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Ct. App. 1983)(manslaughter); Vaughan & Sons, Inc.
v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(manslaughter); State v. Shepherd
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III. PRE-CONVICTION CULPABILITY
An assessment of an agent's or corporation's culpability serves two
distinct functions. First, it satisfies one of a number of elements nec-
essary to establish liability, i.e., the mental element, and, thus, pro-
vides a basis for criminal punishment. After all, it is axiomatic that
theories of criminal punishment require the finding of mens rea.3 7
Thus, the prosecution must establish a requisite mental state in order
to satisfy its burden of proving each and every material element of an
offense.38 As Professor H. L. A. Hart noted, the central question of
culpability prior to conviction is: "Can this man be convicted of this
crime?" 39 Thus, the pre-conviction use of culpability is typically more
restricted, limited to finding willfulness or knowledge on the part of
an actor in the federal courts, or purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence in state courts.40 A second brand of culpability is consid-
ered after conviction at which point the concern is with the allocation
of punishment.41 Here the question is: "How severely is the accused to
be punished?" 42 The post-conviction assessment of culpability reflects
an interest in assessing the interaction between blameworthiness and
harm, in addition to the actor's intent. As will become evident, a host
of other factors may be considered in assessing blameworthiness at
sentencing.
Constr. Co., 281 S.E.2d 151 (Ga. 1981)(restraint of trade); People v. Warner Lam-
bert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295 (1980)(manslaughter); Commonwealth v. McIlwain Sch.
Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413 (Pa. 1980)(homicide by vehicle); Commonwealth v.
J.P. Mascaro and Sons, Inc., 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. 1979)(theft by deception, deceptive
business practices, and unsworn falsification to authorities); People v. Ebasco
Services, Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974)(negligent homicide); State v. Adjustment
Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971)(extortion); and State v. Pa-
cific Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530 (Oregon 1961)(involuntary manslaughter).
37. See, eg., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 114 (1988)("All civilized penal systems make liability to punishment
for at any rate serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that the person to
be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but on his having done it in a
certain state of frame of mind or will."). For a recent review of different concep-
tualizations of mens rea, see Stephen J. Morse, The "Guilty Min&'" Mens Rea, in
THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 207 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds.
1992).
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punish-
ment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071 (1964); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea
and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Or. REv. 107. For an interesting revisionist
perspective on mens rea in relation to due process, see Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea
Reconsidered A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18
STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966).
39. HART, supra note 37, at 114.
40. See infra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
42. HART, supra note 37, at 115.
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State law culpability provisions are elaborate and generally well-
conceived-much more so than federal provisions. Thus, after briefly
considering the many advances made in state culpability provisions
with the passage of the MPC, the discussion will focus on the pre- and
post-conviction usages of culpability in federal law.
A. Culpability under State Law
It is the presence or absence of mens rea, an evil intent or guilty
state of mind, that provides a natural division between blameworthy
and non-blameworthy acts, between crimes and accidental acts. 43 In
assessing culpability prior to conviction, the focus is squarely on estab-
lishing a material mental state, required under a particular statute,
which reflects a criminal intent.
Prior to the codification of the MPC, state legislatures had little
guidance in crafting uniform criminal statutes that consistently de-
fined mental states. In fact, a host of mental states with varied mean-
ings were found in state codes, including fault provisions that are quite
difficult to interpret, e.g., "unlawfully," "maliciously," "fraudulently,"
and "designedly."" Courts, for example, were forced to decipher the
meaning of "heedlessly," "wickedly," "wantonly," and "wrongfully." 45
43. See, e.g., JOEL P. BISHOP, 1 BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAw 192-93 (9th ed. 1923)("There
can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punish-
ment is the sequence of wickedness .... It is therefore a principle of our legal
system... that the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent, without which it
cannot exist." (citations omitted)); HALT, supra note 6, at 243 ("Even apart from
the enormous extent of tort law devoted to negligence and strict liability, it fol-
lows that moral culpability is not essential in tort law-immoral conduct is sim-
ply one of various ways by which individuals suffer economic damage.");
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043 (1958);
Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974 (1932); see also Morse, supra
note 37.
For a fascinating discussion of the crime/tort distinction, see Coffee, supra
note 4.
44. For a review of the development of culpability in state law, consider Ronald L.
Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 575,
578-79 (1988)("The disorder of the American criminal law concerning culpable
mental states assured the drafters of the Model Penal Code of a daunting task. It
also assured the drafters of at least some degree of success; there was virtually no
chance that their product would be worse than that produced over the centuries
by a succession of judges and legislators."); and Paul H. Robinson & Jane A.
Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code
and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681 (1983).
45. These mens rea requirements come from Alabama's pre-MPC criminal laws. See
English v. Jacobs, 82 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1955); Padgett v. State, 56 So. 2d 116 (Ala.
App. 1952); Martin v. State, 25 So. 255 (Ala. 1898); Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108
(1894). Lawson observed that: "Without question the most significant single ac-
complishment of the entire code is the clarification that has been provided the
doctrine of mens rea. The confusion which previously existed in this area of the
law is not totally describable." Lawson, supra note 31, at 658 (citation omitted).
1060
1992] SENTENCING OF CORPORATIONS 1061
With the MPC, four culpable mental states were selected that repre-
sent a continuum or hierarchy of culpability-ranging from conduct
that is purposeful, or consciously designed to bring about a certain re-
sult, to negligent conduct where the actor should have known of a sub-
stantial risk of injury. Thus, liability under the MPC requires that
one act purposely ("with a conscious object to engage in conduct"),
knowingly ("aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause a result"), recklessly ("consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk"), or negligently ("should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk") with respect to a material element of an
offense.46
The MPC also brought with it a critical advance in the interpreta-
tion of offense descriptions. Prior to the MPC, in some states, proof of
one culpable mental state was required for each offense or class of
offenses. For example, there were statutes for which knowledge alone
was required for a particular offense description, and there were
classes of offenses characterized simply as requiring a "general in-
tent." This "offense analysis" was replaced in the MPC with the rec-
ognition that offense descriptions may necessitate separate proof of a
culpable state of mind for the conduct, result, or circumstance ele-
ments of an offense.47 The analysis of the elements of offense descrip-
Lawson noted 10 pre-MPC mens rea terms for crimes against property in Ken-
tucky (willful; wanton; reckless; negligence; unlawfully; forcibly; willfully and
maliciously; intent; willfully, knowingly and maliciously; and knowingly) and six
for crimes against property (willfully and maliciously; willfully, intentionally, or
maliciously-, unlawfully; feloniously willfully and knowingly; willfully and fraud-
ulently). I& at 658-59.
46. See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1980).
47. The MPC defines these four states of mind as follows:
(2)(a) A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of
an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the at-
tendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circum-
stances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or
that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of
his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result.
(c) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the na-
ture and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) A person acts negligently ... when he should be aware of a sub-
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tions ensures clarity and consistency. Most important, element
analysis recognizes complex factual situations requiring more than
one mental state. Grouping the act, circumstance, and results ele-
ments runs the risk of obscuring critically important state of mind dis-
tinctions. As Professor Sayre noted over fifty years ago, "A mens rea
does not mean a single precise state of mind which must be proved as a
prerequisite for all criminality. Mens rea, chameleon-like, takes on
different colors in different surroundings."48
The codification of four culpable mental states added significant
rationality and fairness to state penal law. It has been observed that
the MPC gives "fair warning of what will constitute a crime, limits
governmental discretion in determining whether a particular individ-
ual has violated the criminal law, and provides the distinctions among
degrees of harm and degrees of culpability that create the foundation
of a fair sentencing system."49
Indeed, even though the focus here is on establishing liability
through proof of a mental state, culpable mental states also provide an
initial basis for the determination of a sentence. This may be seen in
one of two ways. First, sentencing judges under most state statutes
use the grade or degree of an offense in order to calculate a propor-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that a material elements exists or will re-
sult from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of
his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross devia-
tion from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(d)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
For a discussion of the importance of element analysis, see Robinson & Grail,
supra note 44, at 683 ("The majority of American jurisdictions have adopted crim-
inal codes that incorporate this Model Penal Code innovation by requiring courts
to apply an element analysis to each offense and theory of liability." (citation
omitted)); and Gainer, supra note 44, at 588 ("Perhaps the greatest potential
value of the overall analytical approach employed by the Code lies in its re-
strained application to the drafting of the penal offenses themselves. The possi-
bility of a superior structure is suggested. If a building block technique can so
simplify the law with regard to mental elements through recasting them better to
accord with distinctions among acts, circumstances, and results, and through re-
examining the continued utility of traditional offense categories."). See also
Sayre, supra note 43; Francis B. Sayre, The Present Signification ofMens Rea in
the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399 (Roscoe Pound ecd, 1934).
48. Francis B. Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 402 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934); see also Robinson &
Grall, supra note 44, at 687 ("The Model Penal Code's move towards 'element
analysis' continued this refinement process by adding to the specific mental state
concept detailed definitions of the required culpable states of mind. In addition,
the concept of a different mens rea for each offense acquired a larger, more pre-
cise meaning. Under the Code, a culpable state of mind requirement may exist
for 'each material element" of an offense. Further, the culpability requirement
may be different for different elements of the same offense." (citation omitted)).
49. Robinson & Grall, supra note 44, at 689 (citations omitted).
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tional sentence.5 0 As Professor Ashworth has noted, "Much of the
doctrine of the criminal law concerns-implicitly and even expressly
in places-the different levels of seriousness of crimes. Different
maximum penalties may be assigned to offences which turn on the
distinction between intention and recklessness ... ."51 Thus, in states
that have adopted the MPC in whole or in part, offenses may be hier-
archically graded by culpable mental states. For example, in many
jurisdictions the types and degrees of criminal homicide are organized
by hierarchical mental states.5 2 Second, judges often use culpable
mental states as a threshold showing of blameworthiness. It is simply
the most logical starting point for a more detailed pre-sentence assess-
ment of culpability.53
B. Culpability under Federal Law
The contrast between state and federal law in regard to culpability
provisions is dramatic. The failure of Congress to incorporate uniform
and hierarchical culpable mental states in the Federal Criminal Code,
as well as a host of federal criminal laws is more than remarkable.54
50. See, eg., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-1 (West 1992). See Robinson & Grail, supra note 44, who make the con-
nection between degrees of harm, degrees of culpability, and sentencing
guidelines.
51. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 14 (1991).
52. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:1l-2 to -6 (West 1992); 18 PA. CONsT. STAT. ANN.
§ 2501-06 (1992).
53. See DAVID WEIsBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLAsSES: WHITE COLLAR
OENDERS IN THE FDERAL CouRTs (1991).
54. Every year, approximately 50% of all convictions of corporations in federal dis-
trict courts are for violations of non-Title 18 federal statutes. During the period
January 1, 1989 to June 30, 1990, for example, the distribution of convictions by
U.S. Code Title was as follows:
Title Number Percent
7 2 0.4%
8 2 0.4%
12 1 0.2%
15 85 19.1%
16 5 1.1%
18 227 51.0%
19 6 1.3%
20 1 0.2%
21 33 7.4%
22 1 0.2%
26 23 5.2%
29 4 0.9%
30 1 0.2%
31 6 1.3%
33 15 3.4%
42 23 5.2%
43 1 0.2%
47 1 0.2%
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Federal criminal law relating to culpability has been described as
"hopelessly confused," "bewildering," and "elusive."5 5 Clearly, the ef-
fort to reform the Federal Criminal Code has held out the greatest
hope.56 The Brown Commission criticized the "confused and inconsis-
49 2 0.4%
50 6 1.3%
Total 445* 99.0%
*One missing case
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ORGANIZATIONS SENTENCED IN FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL COURTS 1989-90, (1991).
55. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96th CONG., 2d SESs., REPORT ON CRIMINAL
CODE REFORM ACT OF 1979, 59 (1980)("Present Federal criminal law is composed
of a bewildering array of terms used to describe the mental elements of an of-
fense.... Not surprisingly, the proliferation of these terms has left the criminal
justice system with confusing and even conflicting laws. Justice Jackson charac-
terized the mental element concepts in Federal law as being 'elusive' because of
the 'variety, disparity and confusion' of judicial definitions." (footnotes omitted)).
56. The debate over the possible reform of the Federal Criminal Code has persisted
for over twenty years. See, e.g., Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 91st-94th Cong., (1971-1975); Edward M. Kennedy, Federal Crimi-
nal Code: An Overview, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1979); John L. McClellan,
Codification, Reform, and Revision.. The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal
Code, 1971 DuKE L.J. 663; Paul F. Rothstein, Federal Criminal Code Revision:
Some Problems With Culpability Provisions, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 157 (1979).
This debate continues with a recent report of the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee unanimously recommending that: "Congress should enact a comprehen-
sive recodification of the federal criminal laws and should create a cede revision
commission to expedite the process." FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., 1OOTH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 106 (1990).
Recently, Senator Howell Heflin proposed the creation of the National Com-
mission on Federal Criminal Law Reform as part of the Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1991 (S. 1569). The Commission would con-
sider, along with a series of proposed reforms, mens rea requirements in criminal
statutes. See 137 CONG. REC. S11,062 (1991)(daily ed. July 26, 1991) (Statement of
Sen. Heflin). The proposal met with mixed reviews. In testimony given before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Adminis-
trative Practice, by Paul Maloney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, on October 17, 1991, the proposal was called "ill-
advised." According to Maloney:
Although the Department of Justice has long supported the concept of
comprehensive federal criminal code reform, we do not favor the enact-
ment of the proposal in Title II.... The nearly decade-long period since
the abandonment of the criminal code reform effort has been a time of
unprecedented legislative activity in the area of federal criminal law, and
one that has resulted in the attainment of some of the goals of the re-
form bills. Comprehensive laws affecting the federal criminal justice
system have been enacted by Congress in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990, and
this year Congress is again considering, at the President's request, an-
other important bill addressed primarily to violent crime. The 1984 Act
was especially important, since it embodied the sentencing and bail re-
forms that had been included in prior Senate criminal code reform bills,
as well as other substantial changes, such as a limitation of the insanity
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tent ad hoc approach" to culpability in the federal courts and called
for a "new departure."57 The need for this new departure was made
clear by the Brown Commission's identification of seventy-eight dif-
ferent mens rea terms and combinations of terms in the Federal Crim-
inal Code. As the Appendix suggests, there was no new departure.
There are currently one hundred and one culpable mental state terms
and combinations of terms in Title 18.58 This is a significant increase
over the already unmanageable number of terms and combinations of
terms found by the Brown Commission in 1970. Moreover, the inven-
tory of Title 18 terms in Appendix A fails to consider the culpability
provisions in criminal statutes found outside of the Federal Criminal
Code.59
Mens rea terms found in the Federal Criminal Code are left unde-
fined, and no federal statute existed at the time of the Brown Commis-
sion, or exists now, providing rules of construction for requisite states
of mind and their many combinations. This results in two significant
problems with the construction of mens rea requirements: interpreta-
defense. Other reforms in recent years have included new offenses
aimed at drug trafficking and money laundering, and the enactment of
statutes permitting both civil and criminal forfeiture for a wide panoply
of federal crimes.
Given the extent to which federal criminal laws have undergone revi-
sion over the last ten years-a degree of legal revolution, as it were, far
greater than has been experienced in the entire previous history of the
nation-we believe this is not the time for another comprehensive
overhaul.
(Statement of Paul Maloney, Department of Justice, concerning the Implementa-
tion of Federal Courts Study Committee Recommendations, S.1569, at 6).
On the other hand, support was voice by J. Vincent April II, who testified- "It
is an inevitable reality that any body of statutory criminal law which is regularly
revisited for purposes of modification, deletion, and addition, will eventually re-
quire a comprehensive revamping to guarantee a consistent and uniform relation-
ship between various criminal offenses which make up the body of that law."
(Statement of J. Vincent April H, concerning the Implementation of Federal
Courts Study Committee Recommendations, S.1569, at 3).
57. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 55, at 60. For an excellent dis-
cussion of culpable mental states in federal statutory law, see United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). This opinion is remarkable for its consideration of
mens rea in federal law, and for its cautions against an overly critical approach to
the limitations of federal statutory law. In analyzing the culpability require-
ments for 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), Justice Rehnquist cautioned that "[tihis system
could easily fall of its own weight if courts or scholars become obsessed with hair-
splitting distinctions, either traditional or novel, that Congress neither stated nor
implied when it made the conduct criminal." I& at 406-07.
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-2711 (1992).
59. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 54. With a significant
number of corporate convictions obtained for non-Title 18 offenses, it is necessary
to consider whether or not similar state of mind problems exist in these regula-
tory and non-regulatory statutes. See, e.g., George E. Garvey, The Sherman Act
and the Vicious Wilk Developing Standards for Criminal Intent in Sherman Act
Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 389 (1980).
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tive variations and redundant combinations. The former may be seen
in differing interpretations by courts of identical mens rea require-
ments within a particular statute, as well as across statutes. The latter
is evident in statutes that combine mens rea terms that possibly have
the same meaning, e.g., willfully and knowingly.60
Federal courts are left to interpret one hundred and one mental
state combinations using prior case law, legislative history, and intui-
tion as a guide.6 1 Meaningful interpretation is further limited by
problems of generality, vagueness, and ambiguity in federal statutory
law.62 Moreover, as shall be seen below, "willfulness"-perhaps the
most obscure of all mens rea requirements-is less than ideal for such
an ad hoc approach to determining culpability.63 Willfulness is cur-
rently used in twenty-three different combinations in the Federal
Criminal Code, e.g., "willfully and corruptly," "falsely and willfully,"
and "willfully and unlawfully." A more detailed consideration of the
use of this term in the United States Code will reveal its limitations.
60. See inkfra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
61. The process of choosing a mens rea requirement for a particular statute is equally
obscure. Consider the history of the bank bribery provisions found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 215. These provisions originated in the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1107, and, for a period of two years, failed to have a mens rea require-
ment, e.g., a corrupt intention. The result was that normal banking and business
activities often were prohibited under the statute. For example, in its strict liabil-
ity form, the statute prohibited a bank official from seeking anything of value for
another in connection with bank business. It also prohibited anyone from giving
anything of value to a bank official in connection with bank business. In order to
cure this defect, considerable debate took place over the selection of an appropri-
ate mental state. This debate ended with the choice of the term "corruptly,"
which allegedly conveys the meaning of corrupt intention. This choice was made
with the knowledge that the term was both unclear and offered little guidance to
those governed by the Act in the financial industry. For debate over the Bank
Bribery Amendments, see 132 CoNG. REC. 943 (1986); 131 CONG. REC. 9274 (1985);
131 CONG. REc. 2591 (1985); and 131 CONG. REC. 7081 (1985).
62. For a discussion of these problems in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 207, see Matthew T.
Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, Comment, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision
of 18 U.S.C § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of
Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 803, 809-812 (1990). These
problems are not typical of all statutes. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUM-
MERS, FORm AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 98 (1991)("Because stat-
ute law is a better source of rules than case-law, and because many rules are
susceptible of highly formal treatment, this also tends to make statute law a more
formal kind of law. Case law can be extremely ad hoc-simply a method of decid-
ing disputes without providing much, if any guidance for the future. Indeed, in
some cases the courts appear exclusively concerned with the past, with clearing
up a mess after the fact. The usual statute is not like this at all: it is prospective,
and operates through rules, many of which are hard and fast rules.").
63. For an excellent treatment of willfulness in federal law, see Kenneth R. Fein-
berg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and the Pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 123, 125-128 (1980).
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1. Wilifuiness
The first statutory codification of a willful state of mind has been
traced to England and the Uniformity of Service Act of 1548.64 Since
the creation of that act, the term "willful" has served in English statu-
tory law, and subsequently in American law, as an elastic proxy for a
host of mental states ranging from "malicious" to "not accidental." In
fact, the term is so elastic that its meaning in any particular statute is
said to depend, at least in part, on a judge's view of mens rea gener-
ally.65 More likely, its meaning is tied to the subject matter of the
statute.66 After United States v. Murdock,67 there has been an evolv-
ing consensus that the meaning of a willful state of mind can be deter-
mined only through an examination of the context in which it is used.
In Murdock, Justice Roberts acknowledged that the term willful
should reflect an intentional, knowing, and voluntary state of mind.
He noted as well that, depending on the statute, courts have used the
term to reflect acts done with a bad purpose, without excuse, stub-
bornly, obstinately, perversely, and with a careless disregard.68 A res-
olution of this inconsistency is achieved by courts accepting a
contextual approach to the interpretation of mens rea requirements in
federal statutory law. Such an approach allows courts to develop stat-
ute-specific interpretations of mens rea terms. This may be contrasted
with Justice Marshall's recent call for a plain language approach that
would require uniform interpretations of identical mens rea terms
across statutes.69 The architects of the MPC choose a variation of the
64. J. LL. J. EDWARDS, MfENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENCES 30 (1955).
65. Id. at 31.
66. See, eg., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933)("Aid in arriving at the
meaning of the word 'willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used
.... "); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)("[W]illful, as we have said,
is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its
context.").
67. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
68. This characterization comes directly from Murdock, where the Court defined
"willful":
The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or vol-
untary, as distinguished from accidental. But, when used in a criminal
statute, it generally means an act done with a bad purpose ... without
justifiable excuse... stubbornly, obstinately, perversely... The word is
also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing
it is lawful... or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not
one has the right so to act.
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933).
69. This distinction was made clear in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128
(1988), where the Court defined a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to include an employer's knowledge or "reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute .... Id at 133. This definition
was borrowed from an earlier decision, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111, 125-130 (1985), where Justice Powell interpreted the willfulness pro-
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plain language approach, but could not do so with the term willful.
Quite simply, the term willful was "unusually ambiguous standing
alone."70 Instead, a provision was added to the MPC that substituted
the mental state of knowledge for all statutory references to willful
states.71
The contextual approach to the determination of a willful mental
state has resulted in a significant number of differing judicial interpre-
tations under Title 18 and other federal statutory laws.72 With regard
vision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Justice Marshall's
dissent in McLaughlin illustrates the contrasting approaches:
The Court today imports into a limitations provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) the "knowing or reckless" definition of "willful"
that we previously adopted in construing a liquidated damages provision
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.... In doing so,
the Court departs from our traditional contextual approach to the defini-
tion of the term "willful".... The Court's apparent abandonment of this
approach in favor of a nonexistent "plain language" definition of "will-
ful" ... is unprecedented and unwise.
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1988)(Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) note on term willful (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Along the same lines, in the American Law Institute Proceedings, an exchange
between the Reporter and Judge Learned Hand was recorded:
JUDGE HAND: Do you use... [willfully] throughout? How often do
you use it? It's a very dreadful word.
MR. WECHSLER: We will never use it in the Code, but we are super-
imposing this on offenses outside the Code. It was for that purpose that I
thought that this was useful. I would never use it.
JUDGE HAND: Maybe it is useful. It's an awful word! It is one of
the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have
the index purged, "wilful" would lead all the rest in spite of its being at
the end of the alphabet.
MR. WECHSLER: I agree with you Judge Hand, and I promise you
unequivocally that the word will never be used in the definition of any
offense in the Code. But because it is such a dreadful word and so com-
mon in the regulatory statutes, it seemed to me useful to superimpose
some norm of meaning on it....
A.L.I. PRoc. 160 (1955).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8)(Proposed Official Draft 1962). The provision reads:
"Requirement of WiU'ulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that
an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with re-
spect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
requirements appears."
72. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 63, at 127. Feinberg's review of federal decisions
reveals seven definitional variations of the term willful: (1) knowledge of illegal-
ity, or an intent to further an objective known to be illegal; (2) recklessness as to
legality; (3) negligence as to legality; (4) immoral objective, or knowledge immo-
rality-such as bad purpose, evil intent, and conscious wrongdoing, (5) intent to
defraud or injure; (6) intent or knowledge with respect to ordinary elements of
the offense; and (7) recklessness with respect to ordinary elements of the of-
fense. Id. Even a cursory analysis of these mental states reveals a full range of
culpability (excluding negligence)-from intention or purpose, to recklessness.
Commentators have overlooked the fact that the obscure nature of wilfulness
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to the latter, willfulness under the Fair Labor Standards Act is know-
ing or reckless conduct, or conduct that is "not merely negligent. 7 3
The requirement of proving willfulness under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act is satisfied by establishing knowledge of the stat-
ute or a reckless disregard of it.74 Under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, courts have found willful action to be deliberate and in-
tentional.75 Willful infringement of Federal copyright laws requires
purposive action.7 6 The Currency and Foreign Transactions Report-
ing Act has a willfulness requirement that is satisfied by both a know-
ing failure to obey the law, and a specific intent to disobey the law.7 7
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that will-
fulness under criminal tax law requires an intentional and voluntary
violation of a known duty.78
The existence of differing interpretations of willfulness across dif-
ferent regulatory statutes is problematic, and is made more so by dif-
ferences between judicial decisions regarding definitions and
interpretations of a single mental state within a particular statute.
This is true for those statutes providing a basis for the prosecution of
corporations found inside and outside the Federal Criminal Code.79
is only furthered by the nature of the corporate form. Courts appear unsure as to
whether wilfulness is established by direct reference to employee acts (or omis-
sions) or proof of willful corporate behavior which is essentially independent of
employee behavior, ag., an entity's reaction or lack of reaction to the discovery of
illegal behavior. See, e.g., United States Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st
Cir. 1987)(direct evidence of bank employees state of mind used to establish
wilfulness); United States v. Sawyer, 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971)(wilfulness
established by proof of a corporation's plain indifference to the requirements of
the statute); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Vir.
1974)(evidence of a "hands off" attitude by the corporation toward compliance
with the regulation constitutes wilfulness).
73. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).
74. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1985).
75. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1396-98 (2d Cir. 1976).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Heilnan, 614 F.2d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1980)(the court
followed a two-part test for willfulness which includes acting with the purpose of
depriving the victim of an interest protected by a copyright); see also United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297
(7th Cir. 1987).
77. United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1530 (1984).
78. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). Justice White announced that:
"Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires
the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the
defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated
that duty." Id. at 610. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the court but
disagreed with the definition of willfulness. "I find it impossible to understand
how one can derive from the lonesome word 'willfully' the proposition that belief
in the nonexistence of a textual prohibition excuses liability, but belief in the
invalidity (i.e., the legal nonexistence) of a textual prohibition does not." I& at
614. (Scalia, J., concurring).
79. Within the Federal Criminal Code, consider the differing interpretations of the
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To make matters even more obscure, judges who face questions re-
lating to the distinctions between "willful" and "knowing" states of
mind often refer back to Justice Butler's attempt to distinguish these
two seemingly different culpable mental states: "'Wilfully' means
something not expressed by 'knowingly,' else both would not be used
conjunctively. . . ."80 However, the effort to distinguish the require-
ment of willfulness from other mens rea requirements may be no
more than a semantic one. As one commentator has observed, sup-
porting a "decision as an interpretation of statutory 'willfulness'
rather than of intention ... [is] a distinction without a difference."8'
In fact, the most reasonable view is that willfulness is no more than a
term of art which may encompass all culpable mental states that ex-
ceed negligence.82 In this sense, it resembles the common law concep-
tualization of general intent.83
In part because of its broad reach, the unsparing use of willfulness
by Congress has had a truncating effect on the presence of different
mens rea requirement for the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, found in
United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1986)(specific intent must be es-
tablished); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1984) (reckless disregard is
sufficient); United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983)(deliberate igno-
rance is sufficient); and United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984)(will-
ful blindness is sufficient). Outside the Federal Criminal Code, consider the
differing mens rea interpretations under the anti-fraud provisions of § 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 77x, found in Elbel v. United States, 364
F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966)(willful intent judged
according to a reckless indifference test); United States v. Amik, 439 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971)(reckless misinterpretation is suffi-
cient); United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978)(specific intent is re-
quired); and United States v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir. 1960)(fraudulent
intent is required). For a discussion of scienter under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, see Craig L. Griffin, Corporate Scienter Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 34 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1227 (1989).
80. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 169 F. 69, 71 (8th Cir. 1909).
81. GLILLE L. WLLIAMS, TuE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 39 (1965).
82. As was noted by the National Commission on the Reform of the Federal Criminal
Law,
There may be no word in the Federal criminal lexicon which has caused
as much confusion as the word "willfully" (or "willful"). In ordinary
speech, the word probably connotes something between purpose and
malice, and also something of obstinacy. Despite the confusion that the
word has engendered, it has an accepted place in Federal criminal law
and can be eliminated only with difficulty. The next best thing to elimi-
nating it entirely is to attempt to give it a clear, fixed meaning. This has
been done by providing that a person engages in conduct "willfully" if he
engages in it "intentionally," "knowingly," or "recklessly." So confined,
the word offers a useful means of referring to the more serious degrees
of culpability. None of its connotations have significance for the criminal
law.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note
27, at 128 (citation omitted).
83. See HALL, supra note 6, at 143.
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mens rea terms in federal statutes. The full range of culpable mental
states in the MPC hierarchy is absent, for example, from the Federal
Criminal Code. Consider the use of recklessness, or the conscious dis-
regard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. It is identified in only
seven provisions of the Code.84 Over time, however, courts have ruled
that the mens rea requirements of an additional twelve statutes,
which most often require willful and knowing acts, may be satisfied by
a reckless state of mind.85
84. The term reckless appears in the following provisions of the Federal Criminal
Code: 18 U.S.C. § 33 (1991)("Destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facil-
ities. Whoever willfully, with intent to endanger the safety of any person on
board or anyone who he believes will board the same, or with a reckless disregard
for the safety of human life .... "); 18 U.S.C. § 35(b)(1991)("Imparting or convey-
ing false information.... (b) Whoever willfully and maliciously, or with reckless
disregard for the safety of human life . . ."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 831(b)(1)(B)(i)(H)(1991)("Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materi-
als.... [The punishment for an offense is imprisonment if] the offender, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the life of an individual,
knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby recklessly causes the death of or
serious bodily injury to any person . . ."); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1991)("Unlawful
acts.... (2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), it shall be unlawful for
any person, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the safety of another, to
discharge or attempt to discharge a firearm at a place that the person knows is a
school zone."); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1991) "Tampering with consumer products. (a)
Whoever, with reckless disregard for the risk that another person will be placed
in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to such risk, tampers with any consumer product that affects inter-
state or foreign commerce .... "); 18 U.S.C. § 1861 (1991)('Deception of prospec-
tive purchasers. Whoever... in reckless disregard of the truth, falsely represents
to any such person that any tract of land shown to him is public land of the
United States subject to sale, settlement, or entry, or that it is of a particular
surveyed description, thereby deceiving the person to whom such representation
is made .... "); 18 U.S.C. § 1864(a)(1991) ("Hazardous or injurious devices on Fed-
eral lands. (a) Whoever-... (3) with reckless disregard to the risk that another
person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to such risk, uses a hazardous or injurious de-
vice on Federal land,... shall be punished .... ).
85. The following judicial decisions have held that recklessness is sufficient to satisfy
a mens rea requirement other than recklessness in particular provisions of the
Federal Criminal Code: United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166 (3rd Cir.
1979) (holding that reckless disregard sufficient to satisfy intent element under 18
U.S.C. § 656 (1991)("Theft, embezzlement or misapplication by bank officer or
employee")); United States v. Felice, 481 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ohio 1978)(holding
that reckless disregard is sufficient to find intent to defraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 664)("Theft or embezzlement from employee benefit plan")); Zimmerman v.
United States, 1 F.2d 712, (6th Cir. 1924)(holding that recklessness may justify
inference of intent under 18 U.S.C. § 755 (1991)('Permitting an officer to es-
cape")); United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S.
1015 (1978)(holding that proof of specific intent may be made by showing of reck-
less disregard under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1991)("Statements or entries generally"));
United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that recklessness
satisfies knowledge element of 18 U.S.C. § 1010 (1991)("Department of Housing
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The problem of truncation by a broad interpretation of willfulness
may help explain the absence of references to reckless states of mind
in Title 18. It cannot, however, assist in explaining the conspicuous
absence of references to negligent mental states. There are four ex-
plicit statutory provisions requiring proof of a negligent mental state
in the entire Federal Criminal Code.86 Only two statutes allow for a
and Urban Development and Federal Housing Administration Transactions"));
United States v. Tolkow, 532 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1976)(holding that reckless disre-
gard may satisfy the knowledge requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1991)("False
statements and concealment of facts in relation to documents required by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974")); United States v. Pardee,
368 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1966)(holding that gross negligence may be established by
proof of reckless disregard for human life under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1991)("Man-
slaughter")); United States v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1979)(holding that
reckless disregard satisfies requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1991)("Frauds and
Swindles")); United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1986)(holding that
reckless indifference to truth or falsity is sufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1991)("Frauds and Swindles")); United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, (9th
Cir. 1981)(holding that reckless disregard of truth about fraudulent nature of ac-
tivities satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1991)("Fraud by wire, radio, or television"));
United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203 (6th cir. 1983)(holding that reckless disre-
gard for truth is sufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1991) ('Transportation of stolen
goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State tax stamps, or articles used in coun-
terfeiting")); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1973)(holding that
reckless disregard of whether bills were stolen may satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 2315
(1991)("Sale or receipt of stolen goods, securities, moneys, or fraudulent State tax
stamps")); Farroni v. Farroni, 862 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1988)(holding that willful
action may be proved by evidence of reckless disregard of known legal duty under
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1991)("Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications prohibited")).
86. The following statutes contain explicit reference to negligent states of mind: 18
U.S.C. § 492 (1991) ("Forfeiture of counterfeit paraphernalia. Whenever... any
person interested in any article, device, or other thing, or material or apparatus
seized under this section files with the Secretary of the Treasury, before the dis-
position thereof, a petition for the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture, the
Secretary of the Treasury, if he finds that such forfeiture was incurred without
willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to violate
the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the
remission or the mitigation of such forfeiture, may remit or mitigate the same
upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 755 (1991)("Officer permitting escape. Whoever... negligently suffers [a pris-
oner in his custody] to escape .... shall be fined not more than $ 500 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both."); 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(1991)("Gathering, transmit-
ting, or losing defense information.... Whoever ... having... control of any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic neg-
ative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information,
relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to
be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of
his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, . . . [s]hall be fined not
more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1115 (1991)("Misconduct or neglect of ship officers. Every captain, engineer,
pilot, or other person employed on any steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct,
negligence, or inattention to his duties on such vessel the life of any person is
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substitution of negligence with other mens rea requirements.8 7
It is certainly true that the inclusion of negligence in penal statutes
has been hotly debated for many years.88 However, the relative ab-
sence of recklessness in combination with the near complete absence
of negligence results in a body of federal criminal law that is insuffi-
ciently inclusive. The full range of culpability provisions found in state
law, for example, is missing. And the problem of inclusivity and trun-
cated mens rea requirements is made even more serious by the hap-
hazard collection of mens rea terms.8 9
2. Inadequate Statutory Law
The most promising solution to this ad hoc, intuitive approach to
culpability, according to the Brown Commission is to adopt the MPC's
destroyed, and every owner, charterer, inspector, or other public officer, through
whose fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any
person is destroyed, shall be fined... or imprisoned .... ).
87. The following decisions allow negligence to satisfy other mens rea requirements
found in particular provisions of the Federal Criminal Code: Shaw v. United
States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (holding that proof of negligence is sufficient to
satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 650 (1991)('Depositaries failing to safeguard deposits"));
United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1966)(holding that gross negligence
supports a conviction for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112
(1991)('%Manslaughter")).
88. See James B. Brady, Punishment for Negligence: A Reply to Professor Hall, 22
BUFF. L. REV. 107 (1972); Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal Negli-
gence a Defensible Basis for Penal Liability,16 BUFF. L. REV. 749 (1967); Jerome
Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLum. L.
REV. 632 (1963).
89. The Brown Commission was extremely critical of the culpability requirements in
the Federal Criminal Code.
Unsurprisingly, the courts have been unable to find substantive corre-
lates for all these varied descriptions of mental states, and, in fact, the
opinions display far fewer mental states than the statutory language.
Not only does the statutory language not reflect accurately or consist-
ently what are the mental elements of the various crimes; there is no
discernible pattern or consistent rationale which explains why one crime
is defined or understood to require one mental state and another crime
another mental state or indeed no mental state at all.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORMI OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note
28, at 120.
Professor Rothstein has written that:
There is no question that the federal criminal law badly needs codifica-
tion. It is currently scattered in conflicting measures spread through
most of the fifty titles and a dozen or so of the volumes of the U.S. Code,
and an estimated 50,000 viable decisions. Often quite a few of the provi-
sions relate to the same conduct. The statutes were enacted piecemeal
over two hundred years, with little regard for one another or consistency
between them, and with little modernization to meet changing condi-
tions. They were separate and unrelated responses to the particular
problems and moral notions of the day and its Congress.
Rothstein, supra note 56, at 157.
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hierarchical state of mind organization, along with provisions that
would require element analysis of culpable mental states and corre-
sponding offense elements. Thus, four mental states would be ana-
lyzed in relation to the elements of conduct, existing circumstances,
and result.90 This solution would yield significant rewards for courts
interpreting the intent of Congress in passing certain legislation.
There is no doubt that explicit liability rules and clearly defined culpa-
ble mental states would go a long way in providing certainty, predict-
ability, and structure to such reasoning.
The absence of rules guiding liability and culpability is both unfor-
tunate and conspicuous. Drafters of the proposed Code worked for
well over a decade to provide liability rules and culpability reformula-
tions.91 Certainly, the analogous MPC reformulation produced clarity
and promoted fairness. Thus, it is fair to ask: What is it that makes
Congress willing to settle for less in the federal criminal law? Or,
more specifically, why is the focus in the area of federal law reform on
the creation of new offenses and the standardization of sanctions?
Why is there more concern with culpability in relation to sentence se-
verity, than culpability in relation to liability?
Answers to the first two questions seem straightforward. Congress
passed comprehensive legislation affecting the federal criminal law in
1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990. Therefore, it appears as if there has been a
significant evolution in the substance of federal criminal law. Propo-
nents of this view argue that now is simply not the time to engage in
comprehensive criminal law reform. Such an effort, it is argued, would
entail significant costs in terms of a major "retooling of the system."
Jury instructions and indictment forms would have to be changed.
Practitioners would have to learn the new law. A new body of law
90. The Brown Commission alleged that:
The Federal Criminal Code, as reported, discards the confused and in-
consistent ad hoc approach to culpability that now characterizes Federal
criminal law. Instead it reduces the number of terms used to describe
the requisite mental state to four: intentiona4 knowing, reckless, or neg-
ligent. All other statutory formulations within title 18, United States
Code, are eliminated. The four degrees of culpability that are retained
express the significant distinctions in defining offenses .... By classifying
the offense elements into three types, viz., the nature of conduct, the
circumstances surrounding the conduct and the results of the conduct,
and by considering the state of mind required in relation to each compo-
nent offense element, the Code avoids confusing proof required with re-
spect to each element. Although many offenses prescribe the same state
of mind for each type of element, some do not. Clear analysis therefore
requires that the question of the kind of culpability required to establish
the commission of an offense be considered separately with respect to
each of the elements of the offense.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 55, at 60-61.
91. See Rothstein, supra note 56.
1074 [Vol. 71:1049
SENTENCING OF CORPORATIONS
would have to evolve in order to interpret the statutory changes.92
Perhaps a more satisfactory answer is that the legislative revision that
has taken place, in such areas as bail reform, violent crime, drug of-
fenses, and sentencing reform, reflects a particular political agenda-
one that would not be served by a focus on the notion of culpability.93
The answer to the last question appears a bit less transparent. A
glimpse of the truth, though, may be gleaned from two caveats noted
in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Bailey.9 4 After ex-
tolling the virtues of the MPC's approach to culpability and the move
toward element analysis, he cautioned:
First... courts obviously must follow Congress' intent as to the required level
of mental culpability for any particular offense. Principles derived from com-
mon law as well as precepts suggested by the American Law Institute must
bow to legislative mandates.... Second, while the suggested element-by-ele-
ment analysis is a useful tool for making sense of an otherwise opaque con-
92. See supra note 56.
93. See, e.g., Robert Drinan et al., The Federal Criminal Code: The Houses are Di-
vided, 18 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 509, 531 (1981)(arguing that the hurdles inhibiting
the passage of comprehensive reform of federal criminal laws are neither techni-
cal nor philosophical-they are political in nature); Barbara A. Stolz, Interest
Groups and Criminal Law: The Case of Federal Criminal Code Revision, 30
CRmihE & DELINQ. 91 (1984); see also Feinberg, supra note 63, at 124. ("In particu-
lar, there has been surprisingly little discussion of the proposed definitions of
states of mind and the rules governing proof of culpability. This is probably due
to the technical complexities of the subject and the relatively non-controversial
nature of the particular provisions. There is an obvious reluctance to debate cul-
pability concepts in the new code when more visible and exciting issues, such as
sentencing reform, new rules governing corporate liability, and the appropriate
scope of federal inchoate offenses, continue to occupy public attention." (citation
omitted)). It is somewhat ironic that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976,
1987-2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which gave rise
to the Sentencing Commission, has its roots in the effort to reform and recodify
the federal criminal law.
It is also revealing to examine the evolution of proposed federal criminal laws
following the Criminal Code Reform Acts of 1979 and 1981. Such an examination
uncovers the dual focus on crime control and sentencing to the exclusion of any
effort at recodification. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 99-
646, §§ 4, 5, 6, 27, 29(a), 100 Stat. 3592, 3597, 3600 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987; Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. Nos. 98-473, -596, 98 Stat. 1976,
3140; Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3592, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4395; Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-651, 100 Stat.
3642; Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279;
The Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4395; Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104
Stat. 2962; Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Re-
covery Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4859; Crime Control Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1488.
94. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
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cept, it is not the only principle to be considered. The administration of the
federal system of criminal justice is confided to ordinary mortals, whether
they be lawyers, judges, or jurors. This system could easily fall of its own
weight if courts or scholars become obsessed with hair-splitting distinctions,
either traditional or novel, that Congress neither stated nor implied when it
made the conduct criminal.9 5
Thus, the simple answer is that distinctions in culpable mental
states must give way to revelations of legislative intent. Such a view
trivializes the problem with interpreting Congressional intent.96
Moreover, because there is so little evidence of legislative intent, it
suggests that the idea of culpability in relation to liability is not too
important. Of course, the weakness of this view is made clear by the
connectedness of culpability assessments. As has been noted, culpabil-
ity assessments at both the pre- and post-conviction stage are often
inextricably intertwined.97 A clear and concise set of liability rules
and culpability standards would be of little value without a sentencing
scheme that considers the blameworthiness of the defendant. Like-
wise, a well-crafted set of sentencing guidelines that considers blame-
worthiness is far less valuable where the assessment of culpability in
relation to liability is obscure.9 S
The absence of needed reforms is also conspicuous because the
Sentencing Commission's last-minute effort to consider an assessment
of culpability produced greater clarity for federal judges assessing
blameworthiness after conviction, than the Federal Criminal Code
does prior to conviction.99 As shall be discussed later, the Sentencing
Commission was more explicit than Congress has been in identifying
and defining culpable mental states for the purpose of assessing
blameworthiness, even in the absence of statutory law that requires
the same for the purpose of conviction.
The risks associated with a poorly articulated federal statutory law
95. Id. at 406-07.
96. See, e.g., ATIYAH & SuMMERs, supra note 62, at 110. ("As is well known, a wide
range of sources may be consulted by American courts in their search for legisla-
tive intent. These include Congressional (or state legislative) debates; reports of
committees; statements of those sponsoring the legislation; comments and view of
legislators, officials, and other parties at legislative hearings; and other similar
material. Much of this material is not only unhelpful in ascertaining 'legislative
intention' but deliberately distorting-such as speeches inserted in the Congres-
sional Record, but never actually delivered, or statements made with the deliber-
ate aim of influencing judicial interpretation, even though they did not represent
the general view in the Congress." (citations omitted)).
97. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
98. Herbert L. Packer states the argument in terms of fairness: "And whatever fair-
ness may be thought to mean on the procedural side, its simplest (if most ne-
glected) meaning is that no one should be subjected to punishment without
having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his culpability." HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 69 (1968).
99. See infra note 137.
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are twofold. First, the confusion that surrounds culpability assess-
ment-within and across statutes-may make liability judgments sus-
pect. Lack of definitions and guidance concerning construction of
seemingly redundant terms remains an ongoing and significant prob-
lem.100 This problem is compounded by the absence of a hierarchy of
culpable mental states and distinct material elements in offense de-
scriptions which allow for something more than a mere offense analy-
sis. It is further complicated by the complex nature of the corporate
form. The well-accepted legal fiction of imputing the culpability of an
agent to an entity is stretched to its logical limit where there is no
overriding consensus as to what that culpability consists of. Commen-
tators have argued that state criminal law, before the MAPC, was often
confused and arbitrary.101 Current federal law is certainly no better.
A second concern relates to the connection between pre- and post-
conviction assessments of culpability. As discussed above, ascribing
culpability is a central feature of finding liability. Even though it is
narrowly focused, the ascription does provide a threshold measure of
blameworthiness that reflects on the deservedness of a sanction. In-
deed, it is this connection between pre-conviction ascription of culpa-
bility and post-conviction decisionmaking with regard to proportional
sanctions that makes a remedy for inadequate statutory law all the
more important. Obscure culpability requirements compromise the
more general assessment of blameworthiness that takes place after
conviction in accordance with sentencing guidelines.102
IV. POST-CONVICTION CULPABILITY
Principles of commensurate dessert acknowledge the critical role
of culpability and harm in sentencing. Punishment, it is alleged, as-
cribes or imparts blame. Thus, the extent of a sanction carries with it
a message concerning the degree of blameworthiness and seriousness
of an offense.103 Judgments of seriousness may be based upon the na-
100. It may be argued that this is more of a theoretical than practical problem. In
other words, federal prosecutors and judges concern themselves, more generally,
with finding "scienter" or a "general intent" even when an element of a statute
specifies a particular culpable mental state. Accordingly, an actor's intention may
be inferred from the very act of fraud, for example, without the necessity of pro-
viding any separate proof of a mental state. Such a view is unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons. First, transforming specific mens rea requirements into a
general requirement for finding scienter alters the meaning of the statute. Sec-
ond, such a practice may result in a lack of notice concerning the ingredients of
an offense.
101. See Robinson & Grail, supra note 44.
102. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
103. Cardinal proportionality requires that "the overall level of the penalty scale, both
maximum punishment and actual sentence ranges, should not be disproportion-
ate to the magnitude of the offending behaviour ... [Tihis concept of proportion-
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ture of the injury (harm), the intensity of the harm, the proximity of
the harm, and the degree of culpability.104
Culpability, harm, and seriousness form the basis of what has been
called a "normative lens" through which judges view criminal cases.1 05
Interestingly, such a lens permits judgments that transcend the stric-
tures of the written law. Thus, judges often look beyond statutes and
codes in order to conceptualize harm and culpability. In an examina-
tion of the sentencing practices of federal district court judges, it was
observed that "the conventional elements of criminal intent that are
essential to establishing grounds for conviction in a criminal case are
often the starting point for a judge's consideration of blameworthi-
ness. But this consideration usually reaches beyond the starting point
to include a broader moral sphere."106 What is encompassed by the
broad moral sphere of culpability? In federal practice, generally, the
early history of a defendant, details regarding a defendant's role in an
offense, a defendant's motive, and, of course, the defendant's mental
state are all important considerations bearing on a post-conviction as-
sessment of culpability.107
This broad moral sphere is grounded not only in judicial practice
but is also explicitly found in law. In capital sentencing, for example,
the United States Supreme Court recently held that a jury may hear
victim impact evidence.10s Victim impact statements reflect an of-
fender's culpability. To deprive a jury of such evidence would unrea-
sonably restrict relevant information bearing on culpability. In the
past, the Supreme Court has given judges close to free reign in con-
ducting broad and nearly unlimited inquiries on blameworthiness.
The constitutional limit is with evidence that may unduly prejudice a
defendant.09 Given these boundaries, it seems only logical that the
Sentencing Commission would place significant weight on an organi-
zation's culpability in crafting appropriate guidelines. The wisdom of
this intuition is considered below.
V. GUIDELINES AND CULPABILITY
A. Proposed Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Commission was established by the
ality involves preserving a correspondence between the relative seriousness of
the crime and relative severity of the sentence." ASHwORTH, supra note 51, at 15.
104. I& at 37.
105. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 53.
106. STANTON WHEELER Er AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINALs 20 (1988).
107. Id. at 93-123.
108. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
109. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972).
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 in order to create sentencing policies
and practices for the federal courts.110 The Sentencing Commission
took its mandate from Congress in 1985 to create guidelines for organi-
zational sanctions. Three proposals"'i predated the issuance of final
guidelines.112 In the first two proposals, little concern was expressed
for either pre- or post-conviction assessments of culpability.
Though the Sentencing Commission's mandate called for an unten-
able integration of "just punishment, deterrence, public protection
and rehabilitation," the underlying theoretical position taken in the
first two proposals reflected an economic model of deterrence best
represented by the writings of Gary Becker.113 The central tenet of
this model is that punishment represents disincentives to engage in
crime, or, viewed differently, incentives to engage in compliance, by
altering the means by which offenders calculate the gains of crime and
the costs of punishment. Simply put, because corporations are af-
fected largely by monetary concerns, sanctions such as fines, restitu-
tion and forfeitures are most appropriate, and the policy undergirding
their distribution is determined by reference to the monetary loss
caused by the offense, the likelihood of apprehension, and the enforce-
ment costs that result in investigation, prosecution and punishment."14
This model has been subject to numerous criticisms that shall not
be explored here, e.g., difficulty in determining harm, questions re-
garding the calculations performed by the multiplier, and the role of
offender characteristics."15 What is open to discussion here is the ten-
uous relationship of this early approach of the Sentencing Commission
to the substantive criminal law, principally as it concerns both pre-
and post-conviction assessments of culpability.
110. 18 U.s.c. §§ 3551-80 (1991); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1991).
111. UNrED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING OF ORGANIZATIONS (Dis-
cussion Draft 1988); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING OF
ORGANIZATIONS (Preliminary Draft 1989); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS-
SION, SENTENCING OF ORGANIZATIONS (Proposed Guidelines 1990).
112. For a recent discussion of the sequence and spirit of these proposals, see Jonathan
R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 315 (1991).
113. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
EcON. 169 (1968); M.K. Block & J.M. Heineke, A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the
Criminal Choice, 65 A14. ECON. REv. 314 (1975); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1193 (1985); see also Parker,
supra note 8. For a summary of the philosophical bases for imposing sanctions, as
specified by Congress, see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)(1991).
114. Block, supra note 4; see also Parker, supra note 8, at 517 ("My analysis concludes
that monetary sanctions are by far the most desirable form of sentence for orga-
nizational offenders in general, because a monetary penalty both minimizes the
societal losses resulting from the sanctioning process and affects most directly the
monetary incentives that drive organizational behavior.").
115. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 9-15.
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Essentially, the early work of the Sentencing Commission ignored
the relationship between sentencing aims and the larger aims of the
substantive criminal law. To the extent that such aims were consid-
ered, they were reduced to the single, general claim that the funda-
mental aim of the criminal law is to prevent harm. Such a view is
correct, of course, from a minimalist perspective, yet the pursuit of
that general aim is clearly imbedded in important collateral notions as
well, which are represented most clearly by culpability requirements.
The criminal sanction is a stigmatizing instrument, functioning as a
condemnatory response to an actor's culpability and the harm done.
The convention that society has chosen to reflect that condemnation
takes the form of adverse economic consequences or deprivations of
liberty. Out of fairness, the criminal law affords a host of procedural
safeguards to those not responsible for, and thus not worthy of, blame.
Of course, this view of the criminal law is a moral interpretation, and
those taking this position point out that it is the moral connotation
given to blameworthiness that distinguishes criminal liability and pun-
ishment from liability under administrative regulations and corre-
sponding civil sanctions."16
The Sentencing Commission initially failed to address the fact that
culpability is essential for purposes of crime control. 117 It is unreason-
able to expect to control crime when criminal sanctions are not com-
mensurate with culpability. Punishment will lose much of its
deterrent value if the entity receiving or threatened with punishment
is incapable of controlling present or future conduct.1lS
In considering organizational sanctions, little attention was paid by
the Sentencing Commission to the moral connotations represented in
the intent requirements found in the criminal law. That blame, in
general, can be imposed only when the actor is "responsible" for its
actions, and that the extent of culpability must affect the degree to
which an actor may be held blameworthy went largely unaddressed in
the first two proposals. It is worthwhile examining each one of these
concerns in more detail.
The stated objective of punishment under the economic approach
is to provide corporations with realistic and compelling disincentives
to engage in crime.119 By confronting the corporation with an effec-
116. See supra note 43.
117. ASHWORTH, supra note 51, at 12-16.
118. See HART, supra note 37, at 133-34 ("[Mlany writers, including Professor
Glanville Williams, have shared an assumption that to be a deterrent the threat
of punishment must be capable of entering into the deliberations of the criminal
as a guide at the moment when he contemplates his crime.").
119. See RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397 (3d ed. 1986)("An im-
portant question about the social responsibility of corporations is whether the
corporation should always obey the law or just do so when the expected punish-
ment costs outweigh the expected benefits of violation. If the expected punish-
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tive response to non-compliance, the entity will take the desired steps
to ensure that its employees comply with the law. At least three alter-
native paths are available to achieve this aim. The state may impose
monetary sanctions directly on the corporation, it may adopt a series
of incapacitative sanctions that allow for intervention in the manage-
ment and operations of the corporation, or it may encourage self-en-
forcement through the creation and maintenance of compliance
programs, ethics training programs, and other more informal means of
self-policing.12 0 The Sentencing Commission's early work followed
the first path. The rationale for monetary sanctions may be derived
from the economic model of deterrence. First, since corporations op-
erate largely to produce profit, sanctions that are not directly relevant
to that goal are incidental. For costs to be weighed against benefits,
the unit of analysis for both must be equal. Such a position devalues
any alternative goal that may be operating; e.g., power, prestige, corpo-
rate social responsibility; or maintains that such alternative goals are
means to the larger goal of profit. The converse of this latter point is
that any non-monetary sanctions, such as community service and pro-
bation, found in subsequent Sentencing Commission proposals, work
only by their impact in economic terms.121 Adverse publicity sanc-
tions, for example, contain meaning only by virtue of the reduced
profitability rising from the abandonment by customers and
suppliers.12 2
Second, the economic model of deterrence generally employs some
determination of illegal gain in order to produce either incentives or
disincentives. Yet, the gains derived through corporate crime are not
necessarily equivalent to the harms typically produced. Corporate
crimes may result in little distinguishable gain and significant social
costs. Reliance on gain alone, therefore, cannot be reconciled with the
criminal law doctrine that the punishment imposed be proportionate
to the harm caused or risked by the offense. 2 3 To the extent that the
Sentencing Commission considered this point, the model undergirding
ment costs are set at the efficient level, the question answers itself; the
corporation will violate the law only when it is efficient to do so.").
120. See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation. A New Strategy for Corporate
Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1466 (1982).
121. See, eg., Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanction-
ing Corporate Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 Am. CRns. L. REV. 1
(1988); Christopher Kennedy, Comment, Criminal Sentences for Corporations:
Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 443 (1985); Fred L. Rush, Corpo-
rate Probation: Invasive Techniques for Restructuring Institutional Behavior, 21
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 33 (1986).
122. See, e.g., JOHN BRArT-WAITE, CRIUME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION (1989); BRENT
FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFEND-
ERS (1983); Brent Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against
Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U. L. REv. 107 (1971).
23. Cf Block, supra note 4.
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the first set of guidelines substitutes social loss for corporate gain.
Given this proposition, it may be argued that monetary sanctions are
the only penalties that may reflect offense harm.
The ultimate impact of non-monetary sanctions cannot be con-
trolled in a fashion that does not risk over-deterrence. Because it is
difficult to assess how much intervention is necessary to force the cor-
poration to discontinue its illegal activity, the likely result, so the logic
goes, is that the intervention may exceed what is actually required
within the organizational structure. Finally, since punishment entails
costs to the government, monetary sanctions appear to present fewer
burdens in administration than do non-monetary sanctions, which the
courts are ill-equipped to provide.
What is striking about this early approach is the lack of any mean-
ingful connection to the concept of corporate culpability. That the
Sentencing Commission initially adopted a "black box" approach to
corporate control through sanctions is not overstated. The first propo-
sal noted the relevance of this concern by commenting that the goals
of the corporation may not necessarily be the same as the goals of indi-
viduals acting at various levels within the corporate bureaucracy. Yet,
the response offered suggested an unwillingness to delve into the mire
of corporate accountability.
The Sentencing Commission's early failure to give credence to the
moral connotations implied by the culpability requirements of sub-
stantive criminal law is best demonstrated by their unwillingness to
adequately address the role that culpability plays in determining the
seriousness of corporate offenses. Clearly, as has been noted,12 4 the
severity of punishment is a function of the seriousness of the offense.
Yet, the Sentencing Commission was single-minded in its definition of
offense seriousness, initially limiting discussion to social loss as it is
defined through property loss, e.g., placing the focus on the estimated
monetary value of human life as determined in safety regulations.
Subsequently, the Commission appeared to enlarge its conception of
loss to include: (a) losses to direct victims, (b) enforcement costs, and
(c) social losses, e.g., loss of market efficiency.1 25 Still, the idea of
culpability was secondary and almost incidental. Loss was said to in-
clude the notion of culpability.126
B. Final Proposals
Fortunately, the third set of proposed guidelines attempted to cap-
ture the moral sphere of culpability. In these guidelines, the Sentenc-
ing Commission required judges to consider four mitigating factors
124. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
125. Parker, supra note 8, at 577.
126. Id, at 565.
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that reflected culpability. Evidence of such factors, in the form of a
mitigation score, would have reduced the multiplier.127 Courts would
consider the following questions: (a) Did the offense occur without the
knowledge of any person who exercised control over the organization?
(b) Did the offense occur despite a meaningful compliance program?
(c) Did the organization voluntarily and promptly report the offense?
and (d) After discovering the offense, did the organization take rea-
sonable steps to remedy the harm, discipline those responsible, and
prevent a reoccurrence? In addition to these mitigating circum-
stances, courts would be required to consider, among other things, the
"nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteris-
tics of the defendants."128
This "carrot and stick" proposal was widely criticized. Part of the
criticism was based on concerns over the mitigation score. Would
large publicly-held corporations fare better than small privately-held
firms? Would reduced penalties for compliance programs or monitor-
ing lead to cosmetic programs and lax regulatory oversight? Signifi-
cant criticism resulted in a new and final proposal.129
The final proposal took some additional steps. The Sentencing
Commission agreed that fines should reflect the seriousness of an of-
fense, as well as the culpability of the offending corporation. The for-
mer would be determined by the pre-tax gain to the corporation,
amount of loss caused by the corporation, and a pre-defined ranking of
offense seriousness. The latter would be approximated by a culpabil-
ity score calculated on the basis of an organization's: (a) involvement
in or tolerance of criminal activity (scaled according to the size of the
organization and highest level of corporate knowledge), (b) prior his-
tory, (c) record of violations of orders, (d) attempts to obstruct justice,
(e) maintenance of an effective compliance program, and (f) willing-
ness to self-report, cooperate, and accept responsibility.130
The Sentencing Commission decided that organizations are more
culpable when a "high-level" employee "participated in, condoned, or
was wilfully ignorant of the offense."' 3 ' Here "condone" means
knowledge of and a failure to prevent or terminate an offense. Willful
ignorance approximates the mental state of recklessness insofar as it
concerns a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
127. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COAMISSION, SENTENCING OF ORGANIZATIONS
§ 8C2.1(d)(Tent. Draft 1990).
128. Id. § 8C2.2.
129. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 3 (1991). For
a critical review of the 1990 Draft, see John C. Coffee, "Carrot and Stick" Sen-
tencing: Structuring Incentives for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 126 (1990).
130. 18 U.S.C. app. § 8C2.5 (b)-(g)(1992).
131. 18 U.S.C. app. § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A)(i)(1992).
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Alternatively, organizations are more culpable where "tolerance of
the offense by substantial authority personnel was pervasive through-
out the organization."1 32 In this provision, tolerance appears as a rea-
sonable proxy for negligence, i.e., a high managerial agent should have
known of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
Thus, in these two provisions, the Commission has astutely and
creatively provided judges with a culpability assessment that hierar-
chically grades blameworthiness by proxies for knowledge, reckless-
ness, and negligence.133 The Commission also provided five
appropriate post-conviction culpability measures, ranging from an as-
sessment of prior history, which considers the number of previous ad-
judications, to the maintenance of an effective compliance program.
Thus, the guidelines cover an organization's action prior to the of-
fense, during the offense, and after the offense. This is notable as it is
a rare but certainly welcomed acknowledgement of differences in indi-
vidual versus organizational culpability.13 4
C. Guidelines and Federal Statutory Law
In evaluating the success of the sentencing guidelines it is critical
to consider their relation to federal statutory law. Once again, it is
worthwhile considering the assessment of culpability, both before and
after conviction: To what extent are these new guidelines limited by
extant law? To what extent could the guidelines address or remedy
the weakness in federal statutory law?
The significant assessment of culpability in the new guidelines
provided a remedy for the post-conviction culpability assessment. As
of their codification in 1991, federal district court judges are able to
assess culpability in relation to the deservedness of sanctions by a
threshold measure of hierarchical mental states and by five more
broad indices of blameworthiness, all of which acknowledge the com-
plexity of organizational life and serve as proxies for corporate culpa-
bility. This is a significant advance over the state of the law prior to
the passage of the guidelines. Notably, the sentencing guidelines for
individuals, passed in 1987, provided similar benefit. For a series of
offenses where no grade of culpability existed, a template of culpabil-
ity was imposed.13 5 For example, involuntary manslaughter, which
under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 requires a mental state of "without due cau-
132. 18 U.S.C. app. § 8C2.5 (b)(1)(A)(ii)(1992).
133. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 129, at 71.
134. Cf Leonard Orland, Corporate Punishment by the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 50 (1991) (Orland criticizes the Sentencing Commission's
conception of corporate culpability, finding it to be based upon assumptions that
run counter to organizational theory).
135. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 13, at §§ 2A1,
2A6.1, 2F.1(4), 2H3.1, 2K1.4(b)(1), 251.1(b)(1).
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tion," has been transformed in the sentencing guidelines to ten points
if the conduct was criminally "negligent," or fourteen points if the
conduct was "reckless."136 The Sentencing Commission has provided
needed clarification for judges.
The culpability assessment that the guidelines did not address, and
could not address, was culpability in relation to liability. Providing
clarification concerning mens rea requirements at the time of sentenc-
ing does nothing to address the limitations of federal statutory law
described in section II. As has been argued, the reliance on willfulness
and obscure combinations of mens rea terms, the absence of hierarchi-
cal mental states, and the failure to consider material elements of of-
fenses, make the finding of corporate criminal liability vulnerable to
significant discretion and disparity in federal statutory law.
Additionally, such vulnerability calls into question the seriousness
of proposals that search for genuine corporate intent. Commentators
who suggest the importance of determining corporate culpability,
rather than individual mens rea which is imputed to an entity, may
have underestimated how far the federal statutory law has strayed
into obscurity. In Section V, several proposals for genuine corporate
culpability are contrasted with culpability provisions found in federal
statutory law.
VI. GENUINE CORPORATE CULPABILITY
The evolution of corporate criminal law scholarship demonstrates
a trend toward thinking about the behavior of organizations in the
context of organizational theory.137 Commentators have argued that
it is possible to identify culpability from specific corporate action, as
opposed to individual action.13 8  The MPC and federal statutory law
rely significantly upon a model of "managerial mens rea," i.e., where
136. IH at § 2A1.4.
137. See, eg., Barry B. Baysinger, Organizational Theory and the Criminal Liability
of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 341 (1991); Michael B. Metzger, Organizations
and the Law, 25 Am. Bus. L. REV. 407 (1987); Laura S. Schrager & James F. Short,
Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PRoBS. 407 (1978); Diane
Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MCH.
L. REv. 1377 (1982).
138. For a discussion of the different forms of corporate culpability, see Brent Fisse,
Reconstruction Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141,1186-1192 (1983). In this article, Fisse finds the
managerial (mental state of manager is imputed to entity), composite (mens rea
of employees grouped and then imputed), and strategic (mens rea found in orga-
nizational policy) forms of mens rea to be inadequate. Instead, he proposes reac-
tive corporate fault, where the court would assess culpability on the basis of a
corporation's attempt to employ preventive or corrective measures upon commis-
sion of an offense. I&L at 1195-97.
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the mental state of an agent is simply imputed to the entity.13 9
In a recent article, Professor Foerschler argues that the imputation
of intent from the employees within the corporation to the corporate
entity fails to properly consider the organizational basis for corporate
action. 140 Drawing from the work of Dan-Cohen,141 she notes that
corporate criminal liability can be effective only when based on an un-
derstanding of the decisionmaking process within corporations. Orga-
nizational theory informs us that corporate actions are not simply the
product of individual choice, but the melding of individual decisions
set within an organizational structure and embedded in an organiza-
tional culture. The author reviews two models of organizational deci-
sionmaking:142 the Organizational Process Model, represented by the
writings of Simon,1 43 and Bureaucratic Politics Model, found in the
work of Cyert and March.144
Drawing on scattered principles from these models, as well as from
a model of analysis based on segregational intent,1 45 Foerschler offers
a framework for imputing corporate intent based on three criteria: (1)
did a corporate practice or policy violate the law,1 46 or (2) was it rea-
sonably foreseeable that a corporate practice or policy would result in
139. See supra notes 42-99 and accompanying text.
140. Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent- Toward a Better Understanding of
Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (1990).
141. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); see also Richard B. Stewart, Organizational
Jurisprudence, 101 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1987).
142. Foerschler, supra note 140, at 1298-1302.
143. See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
144. See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(1963); see also GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CU-
BAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).
145. Foerschler, supra note 140, at 1303. This analysis is based on the notion of "segre-
gational intent" as discussed by the Supreme Court and set forth in Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The concept of institutional intent was applied by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in its finding that the school board's policies
served no legitimate educational objectives. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of
Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 184-86 (6th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
146. Foerschler, supra note 140, at 1307. This first criterion addresses whether the
policy itself violates the law. She notes,
To determine what qualifies as a corporate practice or policy, the law
should turn to the organization theory models of decisionmaking ex-
plained above in Section II(B). Both the BP [Bureaucratic Politics] and
OP [Organizational Process] models should be incorporated into the con-
cept of a corporate practice or procedure because, depending on the facts
of the case, one theory may be more appropriate than the other. This
choice will be left to the prosecutor's discretion.
Id. The court should examine either or both the bargaining process (through
memoranda and minutes of meetings in which policies were set) that ultimately
produce the corporate practices and policies, (as suggested by the BP model) and/
or the standard operating procedures used by the organization or organizational
units (as suggested by the OP model) to determine this point. In addition, the
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a corporate agent's violation of the law,147 or (3) did the corporation
adopt a corporate agent's violation of the law?148 Such a framework
shifts the focus away from individuals within the corporation and to-
ward the corporate structure as a means of locating corporate intent.
A system of liability that reflects genuine corporate fault is one
that places less emphasis on the particular hierarchical position of the
actors involved and more attention on the corporation's practices, pro-
cedures, and policies. Professor French has crafted perhaps the most
articulate argument in support of corporate intentionality and it is this
approach that serves as a philosophical basis for Professor Fisse's con-
ceptualization of strategic mens rea, i.e., where culpability is assessed
with reference to corporate policy.149 According to French, the com-
ponents of the corporation's internal decision structure (CID struc-
ture), consisting of the corporation's flowchart and procedural and
recognition rules, make up the elements that define corporate inten-
tion. Whether or not the action is legal or illegal, the corporation es-
tablishes certain goals and objectives for the purpose of carrying forth
the action or intention. Following this reasoning, a corporation may
be held responsible when the act reflects a corporate decision and not
simply the decisions of particular individuals within the
corporation.150
court should also examine the level at which the task or action in question took
place.
147. This second test "responds to those instances in which the corporate practice or
policy does not explicitly violate the law but is designed so as to instigate viola-
tion." Id. at 1308-09. Criminal liability attaches only when there is clear evidence
of an industry awareness of illegal activity and evidence that the corporation's
policies and practices, such as an employee incentive system, could reasonably be
foreseen as leading to the commission of the crime. Id- at 1309-10.
148. This final test "is intended to attribute intent to a corporation not for instigating
violation of a law, but for acquiescing in an agent's violation of the law." Id- at
1310. When a corporation knowingly allows and acquiesces to criminal behavior
by its employees, it can be said to "adopt a policy" in favor of criminal activity.
149. Fisse, supra note 138, at 1190-92; see PT A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CoRpo-
RATE RESPONSIBM Y (1984).
150. FRENCH, supra note 143, at 44. French writes,
[w]hen the corporate act is consistent with an instantiation or an imple-
mentation of established corporate policy, then it is proper to describe it
as having been done for corporate reasons, as having been caused by a
corporate desire coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other words,
as corporate intentional.
Id Larry May proposes an impressive variation of the French proposal with the
following model rules for corporate vicarious negligence:
A corporation is vicariously negligent for the harmful acts of one of its
members if: a) causal factor-the member of the corporation was ena-
bled or facilitated in his or her harmful conduct by the general grant of
authority given to him or her by a corporate decision; and b) fault fac-
tor-appropriate members of the corporation failed to take preventive
measures to thwart the potential harm by those who could harm due to
the above general part of authority, even though: 1. the appropriate
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Most recently, Professor Bucy has proposed an extension of this
work by providing a corporate criminal liability standard that requires
proof of an ethos or personality that encouraged the commission of the
criminal act.151 Under this ethos standard, courts that grapple with
cases that raise issues of corporate liability and culpability would con-
sider the organization's: (a) hierarchy, e.g., the board of director's role,
(b) goals and practices, e.g., whether goals are lawful, (c) reaction to
current and prior offenses, e.g., whether current or past offenses are
recklessly tolerated, (d) existing compliance programs, e.g., whether
internal audits are performed, and (e) compensation and indemnifica-
tion schemes, e.g. whether unlawful awards are bestowed. 152 Such a
consideration would reveal the corporate personality, and the extent
to which it encouraged or facilitated criminal conduct. Criminal liabil-
ity attaches and corporate intention is found in an organization that
perpetuates an ethos favorable to law violation.153
The search for genuine corporate culpability by French, Fisse,
Braithwaite and other scholars reflects an interest in fairly and accu-
rately capturing the intentionality of an entity. Most of the calls for
genuine corporate culpability acknowledge the difference between
human and entity intentionality, and allow for the unique characteris-
tics of non-human persons by considering the complexity of organiza-
tional life.'54 When set against the confusion created by the ill-
defined and obscure culpability provisions described earlier, even a
cursory consideration of these proposals reveal the woeful inadequacy
of existing federal statutory law.
These proposals also point to the inadequacy of those attempts by
some federal courts to use existing culpability provisions in order to
approximate genuine corporate intention. Beginning in 1951 with In-
members could have taken such precautions, and 2. these appropriate
members could reasonably have predicted that the harm would occur.
LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GRoups: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROuP-
BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 85 (1987)(emphasis added).
151. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991).
152. Id at 1129-46.
153. As Bucy notes: "If this examination shows that a corporation whose employees
violated the law perpetuated an ethos that encouraged this violation, the corpora-
tion is criminally liable for the acts of its agents." Id at 1183.
154. Proposals for genuine corporate culpability find their source in discussions of the
moral responsibility of collectives. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS
AND MORALITY (1982); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970); David Copp, Collective Actions and Secondary
Actions, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 177 (1979); Peter A. French, Types of Collectivities and
Blame, 56 THE PERSONALIST 160 (1975); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, The Concept of
Corporate Responsibility, 2 J. OF Bus. ETHics 1 (1983); Keeley, supra note 7; May,
supra note 7; Jerry Surber, Individual and Corporate Responsibility: Two Alter-
native Approaches, 2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 67 (1983).
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land Freight Lines v. United States,Ss a handful of courts have deci-
phered an aggregate, collective, or composite mens rea from the
knowledge of more than one agent or employee.156 The rationale for a
collective intention is straightforward. Corporate knowledge is com-
partmentalized-found with employees in various divisions, branches,
or subsidiaries. A composite of this knowledge, it is argued, reflects
true corporate knowledge. After all, corporations are thought to have
notice, either actual or constructive, of the collective knowledge of all
employees.157
As commentators have suggested, however, there is no reason to
believe that the imputation of aggregated mental states to an entity
achieves genuine corporate culpability.-58 This is, so even when the
finding of composite mens rea reveals the sum of all employee inten-
tions.159 Quite simply, courts that use aggregated mental states in or-
155. Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951). In this appeal
from a conviction of a common carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act, the
court ruled that knowledge of different material facts by different corporate
agents could be grouped and then imputed to the corporation. Thus, corporate
knowledge and wilfulness may be based upon inferences "drawn from a combina-
tion of acts, conduct, and circumstances." Id. at 315.
156. Commentators have been less than kind with the idea of a collective or composite
mens rea. Fisse, for example, calls it a 'mechanical concept of mental state that
fails to reflect true corporate fault." Fisse, supra note 138, at 1189-90. May con-
cludes that composite mens rea is inadequate to explain purposive group action
because it fails to consider group structure. MAY, supra note 150, at 66. Finally,
Bucy labels the fiction a "desperate, but disingenuous, application of the respon-
deat superior or MPC standards." Bucy, supra note 151, at 1157.
157. United States Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 943 (1987)("Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the
elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggre-
gate of those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular
operation."); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D.Va.
1974)("[Ihe corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge
of its employees ...."); United States v. Sawyer Transport, 337 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D.
Minn. 1971), affl'd, 463 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972) (knowledge of employees may be
joined and imputed to the corporation). For a recent reference to collective
knowledge, see United States v. LBS Bank-New York, 757 F. Supp. 496, 501 (E.D.
Pa. 1990)(knowledge from different employees can be joined in order to establish
corporate knowledge, but specific intent cannot be so aggregated); Camacho v.
Bowling, 562 F. Supp. 1012, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 1983)("Other organizations, such as
private corporations or partnerships, are held to have constructive notice of the
collective knowledge of all the employees and departments within the organiza-
tion."); and People v. American Medical Centers, 324 N.W.2d 782, 793 (Mich. App.
1982)("The combined knowledge of those employees may be imputed to the cor-
poration to find it liable for fraudulent acts.").
158. See supra note 156.
159. Composite mens rea cannot exist unless at least one employee (but more likely
two employees) have some material knowledge. Consider Judge Mukasey's deci-
sion in First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) which stated:
While it is not disputed that a corporation may be charged with the col-
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der to establish corporate knowledge most often stop short of
discussing corporate knowledge as independent of employee knowl-
edge.160 The corporation's knowledge is "constructive" or "acquired,"
rather than actual or real. Indeed, genuine corporate culpability
should not be wholly contingent or dependent upon principles of vica-
rious agency.'61 Finally, it is worth noting the striking resemblance of
the new organizational guidelines with models of genuine corporate
culpability. Both move away from notions of agency and the imputa-
tion of intention, to various measures of entity intentionality, e.g., as-
pects of reactive corporate fault. Their similarity makes it easy to
forget that the former relate culpability to sentence severity, while
the latter concern culpability in relation to liability. This fact might
suggest that the law of sentencing is only as strong as the substantive
law that serves as its foundation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In urging Congress to resume the task of recodifying the federal
criminal law, the Federal Courts Study Committee observed that
some of the recent criticisms of the sentencing guidelines may reflect
the "arbitrary structure of the federal criminal laws, a structure [that]
is made transparent by the guidelines."162 A more reasonable inter-
pretation is that the sentencing guidelines, at least with respect to or-
ganizations, highlight the inadequacy of the federal criminal law. The
guidelines confirm the feasibility of assessing organizational culpabil-
ity-but they look strange when compared with current substantive
law. On the one hand, the federal law determines culpability in rela-
tion to liability by the identification of one or more of over one hun-
dred mental states. On the other hand, the federal law determines
culpability in relation to sentence severity through an elaborate exam-
ination of an organization's actions prior to the offense, during the of-
fense, and after the offense.
The development of sentencing guidelines for organizations has
lective knowledge of its employees, it does not follow that the corpora-
tion may be deemed to have a culpable state of mind when that state of
mind is possessed by no single employee. A corporation can be held to
have a particular state of mind only when that state of mind is possessed
by a single individual.
Id. at 260; cf. Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1248-49 (1978).
160. Cf United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), cert de-
nied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). Foerschler has argued to the contrary and that the
collective knowledge cases, like Bank of New England, "virtually eliminate the
distinction between individual and institutional intent." Foerschler, supra note
134, at 1306.
161. Cf. May, supra note 7.
162. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMM., supra note 56, at 23.
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confirmed, as well, that order may not be brought to an otherwise dis-
ordered body of law through sentencing reform alone. The SRA, with
its lofty goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentenc-
ing, is compromised if issues relating to culpability and liability re-
main unresolved. After all, what does proportionality mean? What
good is uniformity and honesty at time of sentencing when both may
be missing in the determination of liability? These questions mirror
the Federal Courts Study Committee conclusion, that the "lack of a
rational criminal code has also hampered the development of a ra-
tional sentencing system." 6 3
163. H at 106.
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VIII. APPENDIX
willful
willfully
willfully refuses or neglects
willfully and corruptly
willfully or maliciously
willfully and maliciously
willfully and maliciously... with the intent
willfully and unlawfully
willfully and knowingly
willfully and knowingly... [with] knowledge
or reason to believe...
willfully... with intent to...
corruptly
corruptly... with intent to...
maliciously
maliciously..., with an intent unlawfully to
maliciously... knowing
willfully, deliberate, malicious, and
premeditated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and
maliciously to...
without malice... voluntary [manslaughter]
without malice... involuntary... without
due caution and circumspection
[manslaughter]
voluntarily
unlawfully
unlawfully and willfully
unlawfully or... wantonly
improperly
feloniously
wantonly
wrongfully
falsely
falsely.., for the purpose of
falsely and willfully
fraudulently
with the specific intent to destroy
with intent to defraud
with intent to defraud.., or to deceive
fraudulently... knowing...
Title 18 Sections
1970 1992
542 542
2 2
2076
2271 1917
1362 1362
35 35
1991
2071 2071
1752
954
32
201
201
549
1659
954
32
201
201
549
1659
844
1111 1111
1111 1111
1112 1112
1112
755
1427
664
1703
1506
1852
185
911
331
1091
472
1006
331
1112
755
1427
664
1853
1703
1506
1852
654
485
709
911
331
471
1006
331
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with intent to defraud, knowingly
with intent to defraud, knowing
with fraudulent intent... knowing...
with intent to defraud, falsely
fraudulently or knowingly
with intent to deceive or mislead
for the fraudulent purpose of...
with intent to defraud.., for the purpose of
falsely or fraudulently... for the purpose of-
through the fault or... with a fraudulent
intent
fraudulently or wrongfully
for any purpose
for any purpose not prescribed by law
with any intent.., that...
with unlawful or fraudulent intent
with intent wrongfully
for the purpose
with the purpose of fraudulently...
with intent to...
with intent that...
with the intent that...
intentionally or maliciously
with the intention of...
with intent unlawfully
intending to...
intentionally
for the purpose of...
with intent or reason to believe that...
knows, or reasonable grounds to believe or
suspect
knowingly
knowing or intentional
knowingly and willfully
knowingly or willfully
knowingly and unlawfully
knowingly and fraudulently
knowingly and falsely
knowingly and with intent to defraud
knowingly and willfully, with intent to
defraud
knowingly and with fraudulent intent
knowingly, willfully and corruptly
Title 18
1970
658
483
506
482
545
703
706
707
917
332
1017
371
653
964
2314
500
114
794
473
1367
Sections
1992
658
483
506
478
545
703
706
707
917
332
1017
371
653
964
2314
1851
47
500
513
373
473
663 663
1426
1343 1343
247
288 288
794 794
568
43 46
403
288 288
550 550
1857 1424
152 152
289 289
479 479
545
2318
1158 1158
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knowingly and, with a design to...
knowingly, willfully, or wantonly
knowingly..., for the purpose of...
knowingly..., with the intent
knowing...
knowing or having reason to know or
intending
with knowledge that...
having knowledge of...
knowing that...
with knowledge or reason to believe that
without reasonable cause to believe...
neglect
with the knowledge or intent
negligently
negligence, or inattention to... duties
through gross negligence
willfully neglects
by willful breach of duty
by will breach of duty or by neglect of duty
recklessly
conscious or reckless risk
with reckless disregard for the risk
in reckless disregard of the truth
with reckless disregard for the safety of
human life [ ]
otherwise than in the proper discharge of his
official duties
without willful negligence or without any
intention... to violate the law [forfeiture
provision]
Title 18 Sections
1970 1992
1657 1657
2152
877 713
207
287 287
224
4
3
491
542
1115
1115
793
1421
2196
2196
231
224
4
3
491
542
1115
1588
755
1115
793
1421
2196
2196
831
1031
1365
1861
35 33
492 492
1094 [Vol. 71:1049
